§ 1. _Typical divisions of theories_:--Teleological and jural, 224; individual and institutional, 225; empirical and intuitional, 226. § 2. _Division of voluntary activity into Inner and Outer_:--The "how" and the "what," 227; attitude and consequences, 228; different types of each theory, 229; bearing of each theory upon problems of knowledge and of control, 231. § 3. _General interpretation of these theories_:--Ordinary view of disposition and of consequences, 232; advantages claimed for emphasis upon consequences, 234; for emphasis upon disposition or attitude, 236; necessity of reconciliation of these theories, 237. XIII. CONDUCT AND CHARACTER 240 Problem of their relation, 240. § 1. _The good will of Kant_:--Emphasis upon motive, 241; motive with or without consequences, 242; necessity of effort, 243; overt action required to prove motive, 245. § 2. _The "Intention" of the Utilitarians_:--Emphasis upon consequences, 246; distinction of intention from motive, 247; they are really identical, 248; motive as blind and as intelligent, 249; practical importance of insistence upon consequences, 251; foresight of consequences depends upon motive, 252. § 3. _Conduct and character_:--The nature of disposition, 254; partial and complete intention, 256; complexity of motives, 257. § 4. _Morality of acts and of agents_:--Subjective and objective morality, 259; the doer and his deed, 260; summary, 261. XIV. HAPPINESS AND CONDUCT: THE GOOD AND DESIRE 263 Residence and nature of goodness, 263; happiness as the good, 264; love of happiness as the evil, 265; ambiguity in conception of happiness, 266. § 1. _The Object of Desire_:--Is it pleasure? 269; desire presupposes instinctive appetites, 270; and objects of thought, 271; happiness and desire, 272; need for standard, 274. § 2. _The Conception of Happiness as a Standard_:--Utilitarian method, 275; Difficulty of measuring pleasure, 276; character determines the value of a pleasure, 277; Mill's introduction of quality of pleasure, 279. § 3. _The constitution of happiness_:--Pleasures depend upon objects, 281; they are qualitative, 282; they vary with disposition, 283; happiness as the moral good, 284. XV. HAPPINESS AND SOCIAL ENDS 286 Utilitarianism aims at social welfare, 286; value as a theory of social reform, 287; its aim conflicts with its hedonistic theory of motive, 289; Bentham's method of reconciling personal and general happiness, 291; Mill's method, 293; sympathy and the social self, 298; the distinctively moral interest, 300; equation of virtue and happiness, 301; moral democracy, 303. XVI. THE PLACE OF REASON IN THE MORAL LIFE: MORAL KNOWLEDGE 306