then, disabling their guns, raised the white flag. The Japanese fire ceased, and the surrender was completed. [Illustration: A Cavalry Regiment crossing the River.] Twenty-one field guns of the latest pattern and eight machine guns were among the spoils. One hundred dead Russians attested the gallantry with which the rearguard had done its duty. Six or seven more guns were also found in a ravine about four miles from the river where they had been abandoned when the Russians discovered that their left flank had been taken in reverse. Eight hundred wounded Russians were reported to have been carried to Feng-hoang-cheng; the number of slain was 1,362; and of wounded prisoners 475, making with 138 unwounded prisoners a casualty list of 1,775. The Japanese losses were remarkably small considering the nature of the ground and the character of the attack. Their casualties were returned at 860: five officers and 160 men killed, 29 officers and 666 men wounded. Among the Russians who died from wounds was General Kastalinsky, who was struck by a shell on Conical Hill. The theory has been advanced that the Russians had no intention of holding the Yalu, and that their purpose was to draw the Japanese into the mountains of Manchuria. Evidence in support of this theory is hard to discover. Surely it was not necessary to lose twenty-one field guns and eight machine guns and to put three thousand men _hors de combat_ in order to tempt an invading force across a river. There can, I think, be little doubt that the Russians were confident of their ability to defend a position of such great natural strength. The general features of the position reminded me of the Tugela, with the plain in front, the unfordable river, and the mountains beyond. According to the testimony of prisoners, the Russians were taken by surprise by the rapidity and ease with which the Japanese crossed this network of rivers. Never for a moment did they dream that the passage would be seriously attempted until four days later. Nor did they suspect the presence of heavy artillery until the howitzers opened fire on the 30th of April. There again we have the evidence of prisoners who declared that they did not credit the report that the Japanese had brought six-inch howitzers over the roads of Northern Korea. An assumption of this kind was folly on the part of men who themselves had carried guns as far South as Anju at a time when the roads were in a worse condition. Nor could it have escaped their memory that the Japanese, having command of the sea, were able to land heavy guns within easy reach of Wiju. The long silence of the Japanese artillery under severe provocation no doubt tended to confirm the enemy in this delusion, but on the 30th of April they must have been well aware of the strength of the artillery South of the Yalu.