The Character of _Cleanthes_, in the same [K]Chapter, is a Misrepresentation of Nature.--“_Cleanthes_ is a very honest Man; he has chosen a Wife, who is the best and the most reasonable Woman in the World: They, each of them, in their respective Ways, make up all the Pleasure and Agreeableness of the Company they are in: ’Tis impossible to meet with more Probity or Politeness. They part to Morrrow, and the Deed of their Separation is ready drawn up at the Notary’s. There are, certainly, some Kinds of Merit that were never made to be together, and some Virtues that are incompatible.” But those who are endow’d with such good Qualities, as Mr. _de la Bruyere_ ascribes to _Cleanthes_ and his Wife, can never agree to a willful Separation. Nay, ’tis a Contradiction to their Character to suppose that either of ’em is faln into those Circumstances, which only can make a Separation become lawful and just. ’Tis true, some Virtues and Accomplishments, as well as some Vices, may be inconsistent with each other. But to apply this Maxim to the present Case must betray a great Want of Judgment and Knowledge in the Nature of Things: For where can one expect to meet with a more perfect Harmony of Virtues, than in the reciprocal Honesty, Reason and Good-breeding of _Cleanthes_ and his Wife? [K: Ibid. fere.] An absent Man often acts out of the Way of common Life, when the Fit of Absence is upon him; but that this Fit should dwell upon a Man, so long as it does upon Mr. _de la Bruyere_’s[L] _Menalcas_ I confess, passes my Belief.--_Menalcas_ rises in the Morning; and from that Time till he goes to Bed again, he never recovers from his Fit of Absence: The Distractions of his Mind admit of no Cessation or Interruption: His whole Life is a continued Series of the greatest Follies. _Menalcas_ is really never _Menalcas_; he has no lucid Intervals; he is always another Man. [L: C. de l’Homme.] If we consult the Operations of our Soul, to discover the proper Causes of what is call’d _Absence of Mind_, we shall perceive that the Powers of it are sometimes contracted within themselves by a Multiplicity of Thought: In these Cases the inward Exercise of the Soul makes it unable to attend to any outward Object. But at other Times the Soul wanders from itself; and in these Cases the Soul being conversant about remote Objects, cannot immediately recover itself, so as to reflect duly on those which are present. So that this Absence of the Mind must proceed, either from a Fulness and Intention of Thought, or from a Want of Reflexion. If it proceeds from a Fulness of Thought, I say ’tis impossible for the Mind to keep bent so long, as that of _Menalcas_ does: It must necessarily have some Relaxations. If it proceeds from a Want of Reflexion, it must be confess’d, that he who can live so many Hours without reflecting, must be either wholly stupid, or some Degrees below the Species of Mankind.