History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Lazan, although at the head of nine thousand men, had remained
perfectly inactive after the skirmish at Castellon de Ampurias; but
when Reding required him to leave a suitable garrison in Gerona,
and bring the rest of his troops to Igualada, he would not obey;
and this difference was only terminated by Lazan’s marching, with
five thousand men, to the assistance of Zaragoza. The result of his
operations there has been already related in the narrative of that
siege.
The army immediately under Reding was, however, very considerable:
the Swiss battalions were numerous and good, and some of the most
experienced of the Spanish regiments were in Catalonia. Every fifth
man of the robust population had been called out after the defeat
of Molino del Rey; and, although the people, averse to serve as
regular soldiers, did not readily answer the call, the forces under
Reding were so augmented that, in the beginning of February, it
was not less than twenty-eight thousand men. The urban guards were
also put in activity, and above fifteen thousand Somatenes assisted
the regular troops; but there was more show than real power, for
Reding was incapable of wielding the regular troops skilfully; and
the Migueletes being ill armed, without clothing and insubordinate,
devastated the country equally with the enemy.
The Somatenes, who only took arms for local interests, would not
fight, except at the times and in the manner and place that suited
themselves; and not only neglected the advice of the regular
officers, but reviled all who would not adopt their own views;
causing many to be removed from their commands; and, with all
this, the Spanish generals never obtained good information of
the enemy’s movements, yet their own plans were immediately made
known to the French; because, at Reding’s head-quarters, as at
those of Castaños before the battle of Tudela, every project was
openly and ostentatiously discussed. Reding himself was a man of no
military talent; his activity was of body, not of mind, but he was
brave and honourable, and popular; because, being without system,
arrangement, or deep design, and easy in his nature, he thwarted no
man’s humours, and thus floated in the troubled waters until their
sudden reflux left him on the rocks.
The Catalonian army was now divided into four distinct corps.
Alvarez, with four thousand men, held Gerona and the Ampurdan.
Lazan, with five thousand, was near Zaragoza.
Don Juan Castro, an officer, accused by the Spaniards of treachery,
and who afterwards did attach himself to Joseph’s party, occupied,
with sixteen thousand men, a line extending from Olesa, on the
Upper Llobregat, to the pass of San Cristina, near Tarragona, and
this line running through Bruch, Igualada, and Llacuna, was above
sixty miles long. The remainder of the army, amounting to ten
or twelve thousand men under Reding himself, were quartered at
Tarragona, Reus, and the immediate vicinity of those places.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account