Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis : $b a course of twenty-eight lectures delivered at the University of Vienna — John Shaqi
Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis : $b a course of twenty-eight lectures delivered at the University of ViennaFreud, Sigmund
Science
Introductory lectures on psycho-analysis : $b a course of twenty-eight lectures delivered at the University of Vienna
Freud, Sigmund
Psychoanalysis
It has happened that other thinkers outside the field of medicine have
disclosed by an observation the meaning of some error and so anticipated
our efforts in this direction. You all know the witty satirist
Lichtenberg (1742–1799) of whom Goethe said: “Where he makes a joke, a
problem lies concealed.” And occasionally the solution of the problem is
revealed in the joke. Lichtenberg writes in his witty and satirical
_Notes_, “He always read ‘Agamemnon’ for ‘angenommen’ (verb meaning ‘to
take for granted’), so deeply versed was he in Homer.” This really
contains the whole theory of slips in reading.
At the next lecture we will see whether we can agree with the poets in
their conception of the meaning of psychological errors.
THIRD LECTURE
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ERRORS (_continuation_)
At the last lecture it occurred to us to consider the error by itself
alone, apart from its relation to the intended act with which it had
interfered, and we perceived that in certain cases it seemed to betray a
meaning of its own. We said to ourselves that if this conclusion, that
the error has its own meaning, could be established on a larger scale,
that meaning would soon prove more interesting to us than the
investigation of the conditions under which errors arise.
Let us once more agree upon what we understand by the “meaning” of a
mental process. This is nothing else but the intention which it serves
and its place in a mental sequence. In most of the cases we examined we
could substitute for the word “meaning” the words “intention” and
“tendency.” Now was it only a deceptive appearance, or a poetic
glorification of the error, that led us to believe that we could see an
intention in it?
Let us still keep to the examples of slips of the tongue and review a
larger number of such manifestations. We then find whole categories of
cases in which the intention, the meaning, of the slip is quite obvious,
particularly so in those instances in which the opposite of what was
intended is said. The President says in his opening speech: “I declare
the session _closed_.” That is surely not ambiguous. The meaning and
intention of this slip is that he wants to close the session. One might
well say, “he said so himself”; we only take him at his word. Please do
not interrupt me with the objection that this is impossible, that we
know quite well that he wished to open the session, not to close it, and
that he himself whom we have just recognized as the best judge of his
intention will affirm that he meant to open it. In doing so you forget
that we agreed to consider the error by itself; its relation to the
intention which it disturbs will be discussed later. _You_ would be
guilty of an error in logic, by which you would conveniently dispose of
the whole problem under discussion, which in English is called “begging
the question.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account