75. What then is the test of the 'general' will? Absolute unanimity is what Rousseau requires of the parties to the original contract 76. But what is to decide whether their successors are parties to it? Not 'residence,' unless there is also freedom to migrate 77. The element of permanent value in Rousseau is his conception of the state as representing the 'general will' 78. Difficulties in this conception. It seems that either no actual state realises it, or that there may be a state without a true sovereign 79. We may distinguish between _de facto_ and _de jure_ sovereignty, and say that Rousseau meant the latter; but this is only an _inference_ from what he says. F. _Sovereignty and the general will._ 80. Hence it may be asked, (1) Is any actual sovereignty founded on the 'general will'? (2) Can sovereignty _de jure_ be truly said to be founded on it? (3) If so, must it be expressed through the vote of a sovereign people? 81. (1) According to (e.g.) Austin's definition of sovereignty, we should answer this question in the negative 82. (Observe that from Austin's definition it would follow that, while every 'law' implies a 'sovereign,' a 'sovereign's' commands need not be 'laws') 83. That definition directly contradicts that of Rousseau, in _(a)_ placing sovereignty in _determinate_ persons, _(b)_ making its essence lie in power to compel obedience 84. Actual sovereignty combines both definitions; the habitual obedience of subjects to the sovereign is due to the sense that by obeying they secure certain ends 85. So far as Austin means that a fully developed state implies a _determinate_ supreme source of law, he is right as against Rousseau 86. But if sovereign power = the aggregate influences which really make the people obedient, it must be sought in the 'general will' 87. Such power need not be 'sovereign' in the narrower sense, and may coexist with a separate coercive power which is 'sovereign' 88. This has been the case in ancient despotisms, and in the modern empires of the East 89. So in states under foreign dominion, which retain a national life, the technical sovereign is not the law-making and law-maintaining power 90. Under the Roman Empire, in British India, in Russia, where the technical is also the real sovereign, its strength rests in different degrees on the general will 91. Thus the answer to question (1) depends on the sense of 'sovereign.' If it = a power which guarantees equal rights, it is implied in every 'political' society 92. But _(a)_ it _need_ not be the supreme coercive power, and _(b)_ if it is so, it is not _because_ it is so that it commands habitual obedience 93. Thus (retaining the technical use of 'sovereign') it is true that if the sovereign is to be so _really_, it must express and maintain a general will 94. Though this is compatible with the fact that some of the laws of the sovereign conflict with the general will