[35] We have already twice recurred, and more in detail, to the impossibility of legitimately explaining universal and necessary principles by any association or induction whatever, founded upon any particular idea, 2d Series, vol. iii., _Examen du Systeme de Locke_, lecture 19, p. 166; and 3d Series, vol. iv., _Introduction aux Oeuvres de M. de Biran_, p. 319. We have also made known the opinion of Reid, 1st Series, vol. iv., lecture 22, p. 489. Finally, the profoundest of Reid's disciples, the most enlightened judge that we know of things philosophical, Sir W. Hamilton, professor of logic in the University of Edinburgh, has not hesitated to adopt the conclusions of our discussion, to which he is pleased to refer his readers:--_Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, etc._, by Sir William Hamilton, London, 1852. Appendix I, p. 588. [36] _Oeuvres de Reid_, vol. iv., p. 435. "When we revolt against primitive facts, we equally misconceive the constitution of our intelligence and the end of philosophy. Is explaining a fact any thing else than deriving it from another fact, and if this kind of explanation is to terminate at all, does it not suppose facts inexplicable? The science of the human mind will have been carried to the highest degree of perfection it can attain, it will be complete, when it shall know how to derive ignorance from the most elevated source." LECTURE III. ON THE VALUE OF UNIVERSAL AND NECESSARY PRINCIPLES. Examination and refutation of Kant's skepticism.--Recurrence to the theory of spontaneity and reflection. After having recognized the existence of universal and necessary principles, their actual characters, and their primitive characters, we have to examine their value, and the legitimacy of the conclusions which may be drawn from them,--we pass from psychology to logic. We have defended against Locke and his school the necessity and universality of certain principles. We now come to Kant, who recognizes with us these principles, but confines their power within the limits of the subject that conceives them, and, so far as subjective, declares them to be without legitimate application to any object, that is to say, without objectivity, to use the language of the philosopher of Koenigsberg, which, right or wrong, begins to pass into the philosophic language of Europe.