It is retained, somewhat crudely, in modern embryology, by those who see in the early processes of growth a significance “rather prospective than retrospective,” such that the embryonic phenomena must be “referred directly to their usefulness in building the body of the future animal[7]”:—which is no more, and no less, than to say, with Aristotle, that the organism is the τέλος, or final cause, of its own processes of generation and development. It is writ large in that Entelechy[8] which Driesch rediscovered, and which he made known to many who had neither learned of it from Aristotle, nor studied it with Leibniz, nor laughed at it with Voltaire. And, though it is in a very curious way, we are told that teleology was “refounded, reformed or rehabilitated[9]” by Darwin’s theory of natural selection, whereby “every variety of form and colour was urgently and absolutely called upon to produce its title to existence either as an active useful agent, or as a survival” of such active usefulness in the past. But in this last, and very important case, we have reached a “teleology” without a τέλος, {5} as men like Butler and Janet have been prompt to shew: a teleology in which the final cause becomes little more, if anything, than the mere expression or resultant of a process of sifting out of the good from the bad, or of the better from the worse, in short of a process of mechanism[10]. The apparent manifestations of “purpose” or adaptation become part of a mechanical philosophy, according to which “chaque chose finit toujours par s’accommoder à son milieu[11].” In short, by a road which resembles but is not the same as Maupertuis’s road, we find our way to the very world in which we are living, and find that if it be not, it is ever tending to become, “the best of all possible worlds[12].” But the use of the teleological principle is but one way, not the whole or the only way, by which we may seek to learn how things came to be, and to take their places in the harmonious complexity of the world. To seek not for ends but for “antecedents” is the way of the physicist, who finds “causes” in what he has learned to recognise as fundamental properties, or inseparable concomitants, or unchanging laws, of matter and of energy. In Aristotle’s parable, the house is there that men may live in it; but it is also there because the builders have laid one stone upon another: and it is as a _mechanism_, or a mechanical construction, that the physicist looks upon the world. Like warp and woof, mechanism and teleology are interwoven together, and we must not cleave to the one and despise the other; for their union is “rooted in the very nature of totality[13].”