Furthermore, if, instead of taking as simple an instance of form as the relations of the three points I have been discussing, I choose to take the sum total of the relations between the material elements (here I use _material_ as correlative to _formal_), which go to make up the life history of a material object, say a tree, why may I not speak of the formal tree as being the same at two times, meaning thereby that the group of relations co-existent at any one time may be regarded as representative of any other group belonging to the one series or of the whole series? To be sure, I am not justified by common usage in thus speaking, since common usage marks only distinctions which are practically important, and by the words "the same tree" includes both form and matter. Nevertheless, I can see no reason why, if this element of form does admit of being considered apart, it is not at least possible to find in this field the kind of sameness we have in mind when we say that we have seen on two successive days the same tree. Again, if I can speak of two simultaneous sensations of redness in one consciousness (_e. g._, the two halves of a red surface), as the same, meaning to indicate simply similarity, why may I not also speak of two simultaneous "experiences of triangularity" in one consciousness as the same, and keep clearly in mind here, too, that I mean only to indicate similarity? If I can speak of a sensation or a complex of sensations in one consciousness as the same with a similar sensation or group of sensations in another, and yet not forget that I am dealing with two things, why may I not do as much for two similar relations or groups of relations in two consciousnesses? If in the one case I do not confound sameness in the sense of similarity with sameness of the kind we mean when we say each thing is at each instant the same with itself, why should I do so in the other case? If, I repeat, the formal element in consciousness is enough of a thing to be distinguished from the material element and discussed, there appears no reason why it should not be open to distinctions of this kind. And when I call up in memory a triangle once seen, the memory image would seem to stand as a representative of the original in both its elements, form and matter. In neither should the representative be confounded with the original. If we may use the word same to indicate this peculiar relation of representation between two things yet recognized as two, it would seem only just to allow this distinction as much in the case of triangularity as in the case of redness or blueness.