Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
Motions, and as many by the Rational Motions, which are Sight and
Memory, at once: But in sleep both the sensitive and rational Motions
make the figures without patterns, that is, exterior objects, which
is the cause that they are often erroneous, whereas, if it were the
former Impression of the Objects, there could not possibly be imperfect
Dreams or Remembrances, for fading of Figures requires as much motion,
as impression, and impression and fading are very different and
opposite motions; nay, if Perception was made by Impression, there
could not possibly be a fading or decay of the figures printed either
in the Mind or Body, whereas yet, as there is alteration of Motions in
self-moving Matter, so there is also an alteration of figures made by
these motions. But you will say, it doth not follow, if Perception be
made by Impression, that it must needs continue and not decay; for if
you touch and move a string, the motion doth not continue for ever, but
ceaseth by degrees; I answer, There is great difference between Prime
self-motion, and forced or Artificial Motions; for Artificial Motions
are onely an Imitation of Natural Motions, and not the same, but caused
by Natural Motions; for although there is no Art that is not made by
Nature, yet Nature is not made by Art; Wherefore we cannot rationally
judg of Perception by comparing it to the motion of a string, and its
alteration to the ceasing of that motion, for Nature moveth not by
force, but freely. 'Tis true, 'tis the freedom in Nature for one man
to give another a box on the Ear, or to trip up his heels, or for one
or more men to fight with each other; yet these actions are not like
the actions of loving Imbraces and Kissing each other; neither are
the actions one and the same, when a man strikes himself, and when
he strikes another; and so is likewise the action of impression, and
the action of self-figuring not one and the same, but different; for
the action of impression is forced, and the action of self-figuring
is free; Wherefore the comparison of the forced motions of a string,
rope, watch, or the like, can have no place here; for though the rope,
made of flax or hemp, may have the perception of a Vegetable, yet not
of the hand, or the like, that touched or struck it; and although the
hand doth occasion the rope to move in such a manner, yet it is not
the motion of the hand, by which it moveth, and when it ceases, its
natural and inherent power to move is not lessened; like as a man,
that hath left off carving or painting, hath no less skill then he
had before, neither is that skill lost when he plays upon the Lute or
Virginals, or plows, plants, and the like, but he hath onely altered
his action, as from carving to painting, or from painting to playing,
and so to plowing and planting, which is not through disability but
choice. But you will say, it is nevertheless a cessation of such a
motion. I grant it: but the ceasing of such a motion is not the ceasing
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