Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural PhilosophyNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Philosophical Letters: or, modest Reflections upon some Opinions in Natural Philosophy
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Newcastle, William Cavendish, Duke of, 1592-1676; Philosophy
perishings and new Creations, this World would not have continued an
age; But surely whatsoever is in Nature, hath been existent always.
Wherefore to conclude, it is not the generation and perishing of an
Accident that makes its subject to be changed, but the production and
alteration of the Form, makes it said to be generated or destroyed,
for matter will change its motions and figures without perishing or
annihilating; and whether there were words or not, there would be such
causes and effects; But having not the art of Logick to dispute with
artificial words, nor the art of Geometry to demonstrate my opinions
by Mathematical Figures, I fear they will not be so well received by
the Learned; However, I leave them to any mans unprejudiced Reason and
Judgment, and devote my self to your service, as becomes,
Madam,
_Your Ladiships_
_humble and faithful Servant._
[1] _Elem. of Philos. c._ 8. _art._ 2.
[2] _Art._ 3.
[3] _Art._ 20.
[4] _Art._ 2.
[5] _Art._ 21.
XVII.
_MADAM,_
Your _Author_ concerning Place and Magnitude says,[1], that _Place
is nothing out of the mind, nor Magnitude any thing within it; for
Place is a meer Phantasme of a body of such quantity and figure, and
Magnitude a peculiar accident of the body_; but this doth not well
agree with my reason, for I believe that Place, Magnitude and Body are
but one thing, and that Place is as true an extension as Magnitude,
and not a feigned one; Neither am I of his opinion, _that Place is
Immoveable_, but that place moves, according as the body moveth, for
not any body wants place, because place and body is but one thing, and
wheresoever is body, there is also place, and wheresoever is place,
there is body, as being one and the same; Wherefore _Motion cannot be a
relinquishing of one place and acquiring another_,[2] for there is no
such thing as place different from body, but what is called change of
place, is nothing but change of corporeal motions; for, say an house
stands in such a place, if the house be gone, the place is gone also,
as being impossible that the place of the house should remain, when the
house is taken away; like as a man when he is gone out of his chamber,
his place is gone too; 'Tis true, if the ground or foundation do yet
remain, one may say, there stood such an house heretofore, but yet the
place of the house is not there really at that present, unless the same
house be built up again as it was before, and then it hath its place
as before; Nevertheless the house being not there, it cannot be said
that either place or house are annihilated, _viz._, when the materials
are dissolved, no not when transformed into millions of several other
figures, for the house remains still in the power of all those several
parts of matter; and as for _space_, it is onely a distance betwixt
some parts or bodies; But an _Empty place_ signifies to my opinion
Nothing, for if place and body are one and the same, and empty is
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