[8] This supposition, though no doubt ingenious, is not true. If the want of accuracy of hearing arose in fact from the inequality of the power of the two organs, this defect might be remedied by using but one ear; but experience gives a different result. We shall not discuss, in relation to the same principle of inequality of the organs, the explanation of strabismus; but at least, for every thing that relates to the just appreciation of colours, this principle is no more applicable than to the just appreciation of sounds. I know a man who has never been able to distinguish the _blue of the sky_ from _the green of the sea_, and he succeeds no better by closing one eye. [9] We cannot, without confounding all the ideas we have formed of the senses, give this name to the memory, imagination and judgment; at the most we might give the name of internal senses to certain sensations which inform us of the particular state of some internal organ, in the same way as the external senses make us acquainted with the properties and state of external bodies. [10] We cannot conceive how the judgment can be weak or strong, if we do not understand by it that it is habitually accurate or inaccurate. His judgment is sound who usually perceives the true relations between things; and this is independent of the number and variety of the ideas upon which he has to pronounce. The man to whose mind there is presented but a small number of relations, has but little imagination; but if these relations be true, we cannot say that his judgment is weak. [11] Bichat, in order to retain for the organs of organic life the character of irregularity in the forms which he had assigned to them, has been compelled to avail himself of the inequality of the size of the congenerous organs. He soon repented having established an uniform principle; and in this case for example, he is near being condemned by the very sentence which he has himself pronounced. The locomotive system, in fact, the symmetry of which no person before him thought of denying, is destitute of it according to the principle he has established, since it presents in its two halves an inequality of size and action. In order to avoid this consequence, Bichat has maintained that the inequality of size arose from the inequality of action, and that this was the result, not of an original disposition, but of our social habits only. To prove this assertion, he has been compelled to heap sophism on sophism; he cannot in this case be suspected of a wish to deceive; he was convinced of the truth of the principle, and we know that to prove what is believed to be true, the weakest reasons always seem to be sufficient. But these very errors should be turned to our advantage, by showing us how dangerous is the tendency of generalizing upon every thing, since it was capable of misleading so judicious a mind.