The manners of a king also ought to be the preceptors of his government. For thus the beauty of it will immediately shine forth, since he who imitates God through virtue will be dear to him whom he imitates; and much more will he be dear to his subjects. For no one who is beloved by divinity will be hated by men; since neither do the stars, nor the whole world hate God. For if they hated their ruler and leader, they would never be obedient to him. But because he governs properly, mundane affairs are well governed. I therefore, indeed, apprehend that the terrene king ought not to be deficient in any one of the virtues which pertain to the celestial king. But as the former is a certain foreign and external thing, in consequence of proceeding to men from the heavens; so, likewise, his virtues may be conceived to be the works of God, and to accede to him through divinity. And if you consider the thing from the beginning, you will find what I say to be true. For the terrestrial king obtains possession of the race of men by a communion, which is the first and the most necessary of all things. And this race is also the possession of him who governs every thing in the universe. For it is impossible that any thing can subsist without friendship and communion; the truth of which may be easily seen, if the accustomed communion which exists among citizens is supposed to be destroyed; since this is much inferior to a divine and royal nature. For natures of this kind are not oppressed by any such indigence; but, conformably to intellect, they supply the wants of others, and afford them assistance in common. For they are perfect in virtue. But the friendship which is in a city, and which possesses a certain common end, imitates the concord of the universe. But without the arrangement of magistrates no city can be inhabited. In order, however, to effect this arrangement, and to preserve the city, laws are necessary, and a certain political domination, and also a governor and the governed. But, the consequence of these things is, the general good, a certain concinnity, and the consent of the multitude in conjunction with concordant persuasion. He, likewise, who governs according to virtue, is called a king, and is so [in reality]; since he possesses the same friendship and communion with his subjects as divinity possesses with the world, and the natures which it contains. All benevolence, however, ought to be exerted; in the first place, indeed, by the king towards his subjects; but in the second place, by the subjects towards the king: and this benevolence should be such as that of a parent towards his child, of a shepherd towards his flock, and of law towards him who uses it.