For there is one virtue pertaining to the government, and to the life of men. But no one should through indigence solicit the assistance of others, when he is able to supply himself with what nature requires. For though there is a general communion [in the city], yet every one should so live as to be sufficient to himself; since he who is sufficient to himself does not appear to require the aid of any other person in his passage through life. If, therefore, it is necessary to lead an active life, it is evident that a king, though he should also assume other things, will, nevertheless, be sufficient to himself. For he will have friends through his own virtue; and in using these, he will not use them by any other virtue than that by which he regulates his own life. For it is necessary that he should follow a virtue of this kind, since he cannot procure any thing which is more excellent. And God, indeed, not having either ministers or servants[18], nor employing any mandate, and neither crowning nor proclaiming those that are obedient to him, or disgracing those that are disobedient, thus administers so great an empire. But as it appears to me exhibiting himself to be most worthy of imitation, he inserts in all things a vehement desire of participating his nature. He is, however, good; and the communication of goodness, and this, with the greatest facility, is his only work. But those who imitate him[19], accomplish every thing in a better manner through this imitation. And the imitation of him is to every thing the source of sufficiency. For there is not one virtue which makes things to be acceptable to God, and another which imitates him; [but both these are effected by one and the same virtue]. And is not our terrestrial king in a similar manner sufficient to himself? For assimilating himself to one, and that the most excellent nature, he will beneficently endeavour to render all whom he governs similar to himself. But such as offer violence to, and compel their subjects, entirely[20] destroy in every individual of the community a promptitude to imitate [that which is most excellent]. For without benevolence, it is impossible there can be assimilation; since benevolence especially destroys every thing of a terrific nature. It is much to be wished, indeed, that human nature was not in want of persuasion: for persuasion is the relic of human depravity, of which this temporary animal [man] is not destitute. Persuasion, indeed, is a thing proximate to necessity; since this first of itself performs those things which fly from necessity. Such beings, however, as spontaneously use what is beautiful and good, are not influenced by the reverence of persuasion; for neither are they influenced by the fear of necessity.