Since the end of the eighteenth century the Danubian Principalities have attracted the unenviable notice of Russia, whose objective, Constantinople, is covered by them. In less than a century, from 1768 to 1854, these unfortunate countries suffered no less than six Russian occupations, and as many reconquests by the Turks. It speaks highly for the national spirit of the Roumanians that they should have borne the miseries entailed by these wars without relapsing into abject callousness and apathy; and that, on the contrary, the memory of their former national independence should have continued to gather fresh life, and that their wish to shake off the yoke of their bondage, be it Russian or Turkish, should have grown stronger with the lapse of time. The Hospodars, appointed by the Russians, were hindered in every way by the Turks in their task of awakening the national spirit and preparing the way for the regeneration of their enslaved people. Besides this, many of these Hospodars were prejudiced against the introduction of reforms which could only endanger their own interests and positions. They were, therefore, far more disposed to seek the protection of foreign States than to rely upon the innate strength of the people they governed. Such were the causes that hindered the development of the moral and material resources of the Roumanian nation. The ideas from time to time conceived by the rulers of Russia for the unification of the Principalities were based solely on selfish aims and considerations. Thus, for instance, a letter dated September 10, 1782, from Catherine II., who gave the Russian Empire its present shape and direction, to the Emperor Joseph II., shows clearly that the state then proposed, consisting of Wallachia, Moldavia and Bessarabia, was to be merely a Russian outpost, governed by a Russian nominee, against the Ottoman Empire. Even in this century (1834) Russia would have been prepared to further the unification of the Principalities, if only they and the other Great Powers had declared themselves content to accept a ruler drawn from the Imperial House of Russia, or some closely allied prince. As, however, this was not the case, the Russian project was laid aside in favour of a policy of suppressing the national spirit by means of the Czars influence as protector. The Sublime Porte, on the other hand, was straining every nerve to maintain the prevailing state of affairs. And finally, Austria, the third neighbour of the Principalities, hesitated between its desire to gain possession of the mouths of the Danube by annexing Wallachia and Moldavia, and its disinclination to increase the number of its Roumanian subjects by four or five millions, and thereby to strengthen those incompatible elements beyond the limits of prudence. At the same time Austria looked upon the interior development of Roumania with an even more unfavourable eye than Russia, and it seemed as though