Portia may expound the law of Venice, but in the English law it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, stare decisis, where the same points come again in litigation. An English judge is sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment (see per Lord Camden, 19 Howell’s State Trials, 1071; per Williams, L. 4, Cl. and Fin. 729), but according to the known laws and customs of the land; not appointed to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old, Jus dicere et non jus dare: (I. Bla. Com. per Lord Kenyon, C. J., 5 T. R. 682, 6 Id. 605, and 8 Id. 239; per Grose, J., 13 East, 321; per Lord Hardwick, C. Ellis v. Smith. 1 ves Jun. 16 T. R. 696, I. B. & B. 563). Stare decisis et non quieta movere—to stand by things as decided, and not to disturb those things which are tranquil, for Omnis innovatio plus novitate perturbat quam utilitate prodest (2 Bulstr. 388);—every innovation occasions more harm and derangement of order by its novelty, than benefit by its abstract utility. The ancient judges of the law have ever (as appeareth in our books) suppressed innovations and novelties in the beginning, as soon as they have offered to creep up, lest the quiet of the common law might be disturbed, and so have Acts of Parliament done the like (Co. Litt. 379b). The judges say in one book, ‘We will not change the law which always hath been used’; and another saith, ‘It is better that it be turned into a default than the law should be changed, or any innovation made’ (Co. Litt. 282b). The rule—stare decisis—does, however, admit of exceptions, where the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason or divine law. _Cranmer._ Ah, my good lord of Winchester, I thank you; You are always my good friend: if you will pass, I shall both find your lordship judge and juror. _Henry VIII._, Act v. Scene 2. Ad quæstionem facti non respondent judices ad quæstionem legis non respondent juratores (8 Rep. 308). It is the office of the judge to instruct the jury in points of law—of the jury to decide on matters of fact. It is the office of the judges to instruct the grand assize or jury in points of law; for as the grand assize or other jurors are triers of the matters of fact, ad quæstionem facti non respondent judices, so, ad quæstionem juris non respondent juratores. It is of the greatest consequence to the law of England and to the subject that these powers of the judge and jury be kept distinct, that the judge determine the law, and the jury the fact; and if ever they come to be confounded, it will prove the confusion and destruction of the law of England (Rex v. Poole, Cas. temp. Hardw. 28).