[32] The account given in _T_ab. II. 394 of the annual meeting of the “Kings of Khurāsān” near Khwārizm for mutual counsel not only possesses little intrinsic probability, but is obviously intended to magnify the exploits of Muhallab. In this case, fortunately, the authorities quoted by _T_ab. leave no doubt as to the Azdite origin of the narrative. Madāʾinī’s version is given _ib._ ll. 19 sq. [33] Wieger, Textes Historiques, 1608 f: Chav., Doc. 273 ff: Marquart, Ēran. 68. [34] _T_ab. II. 490, 860 ff.: Bal. 414 f.: I. Athīr, IV. 66: Anon. (ed. Ahlwardt), 195. [35] Abū ʿUbayda ap. Bal. 426. 10: _cf._ Lestrange, “Lands of the Eastern Caliphate” p. 448, note. [36] _T_ab. 1031: _cf._ Anon. 310 f. [37] _T_ab. 1040 f., 1078. 5: Yaʿqūbī, Hist. II. 330. [38] _Cf._ _T_ab. 1152 with 1185. 5. For the son of Pērōz, Chav., Doc. 172. [39] _Cf._ _T_ab. 1129 with 1144 and 1184. [40] Anon. 337. III. THE CONQUESTS OF QUTAYBA The achievements of the Muslim armies in Central Asia during the reign of Walīd I were due in the first place to the complete co-operation between the directive genius of _H_ajjāj and the military capacity of Qutayba. Qutayba’s strategic abilities have been somewhat overrated, though the Arabic texts are at no pains to conceal the fact that his gifts fell something short of genius. On more than one occasion we are shown in what constant touch the viceroy was kept with the progress of his armies, and how large a part he took in drawing up the plan of campaign, though the credit of carrying it through to a successful issue rightly belongs to Qutayba. _H_ajjāj seems to have had the fullest confidence in his lieutenant, and if he did not hesitate to utter reproof and warning when occasion required, he was equally quick to express appreciation of Qutayba’s success. The Arabs of all parties soon realised that behind their general lay the authority of _H_ajjāj, the wholesome respect inspired by whom prevented any open breach during his lifetime. The second factor which materially assisted the conquests was that in their prosecution Qutayba united all parties in Khurāsān, Persians and Arabs, Qays and Yemen. It was no small matter to keep their enthusiasm unabated in the face of campaigns so protracted and severe, nor can the enthusiasm be explained only by the attraction of a rich booty. It is by no means improbable that Qutayba’s success was really due more to his talent for administration than to his generalship. He seems to have realised, as no other Arab governor in the east had yet done, that in such a province as Khurāsān the safety and security of the Arab government must depend in the long run on the co-operation of the Persian populace, who formed so great a majority in the country. The bitterness of factional strife had shown how unsafe it was to rely on the support of the Arabs alone, especially in the face of such a movement as Yazīd had provoked. By his