merchants of Paykand on their return from the annual trading expedition to China, and the city, after lying in ruins for many years, was eventually rebuilt. The disaster at Paykand roused the princes and merchants of Transoxania to the danger of neglecting the invaders. The feud between Wardāna and Bukhārā was patched up; round Wardān Khudāh, the central figure and organiser of the struggle for independence, gathered the forces of all the nearer principalities. Thus when Qutayba, on renewing his expedition in 88/707, had taken the outlying town of Tūmushkath (not Nūmushkath, which was the earlier name of Bukhārā) and Rāmīthana (or Rāmtīn), he found his communications cut by the troops of Wardāna, Bukhārā, and _S_ughd. It is not, perhaps, impossible that the prince of Farghāna should have cooperated with the _S_ughdians, as stated in Madāʾinī’s account. On the other hand the Arabic narratives are far from explicit, and the _S_ughdians here referred to are much more probably those of Kish than of Samarqand, a suspicion which is confirmed by the famous punning order of _H_ajjāj: “Crush Kish, destroy Nasaf, and drive Wardān back.” Narshakhī and Yaʿqūbī give an account of the negotiations between _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, representing Qutayba, and _T_arkhūn king of _S_ughd, which is certainly to be put, with _T_abarī, after the conquest of Bukhārā two years later. Throughout all these campaigns there is manifest a tendency, common to the early chronicles of all nations, to exaggerate the numbers and composition of the opposing forces. As usual the Bāhilite account carries this to the point of absurdity by introducing a Türgesh force of no less than 200,000 men, an obvious anachronism, influenced by the later Türgesh invasions. The connection is made clear by the mention of Kūr Maghānūn, whom we find nearly thirty years later (_T_ab. II. 1602. 2) as “one of the chiefs of the Türgesh.” The true account would seem to be that Qutayba did not attempt to fight a pitched battle, but by dilatory tactics wearied out the allies and gave time for their natural inclination towards disunion to operate, then evaded them by a rapid march through the Iron Gate and, except for a rearguard skirmish with the enemy’s cavalry, got his army clear across the river at Tirmidh. The appointment of ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān ibn Muslim to command the rearguard gives us the clue, as it was to this brother that Qutayba regularly entrusted all the most difficult commands. In the following year Qutayba was still unable to make headway against the united forces of Wardān Khudāh, Kish and Nasaf, and after protracted fighting (in spite of the double victory claimed by the Bāhilites) returned to Merv. For this weakness he was severely reprimanded by _H_ajjāj, who, with the aid of a map, drew up a plan of attack. The invasion of 90/709 seems to have taken Wardān Khudāh by surprise, as the Muslim army was able to advance at once to the siege of Bukhārā. There