The Art of War in the Middle Ages A.D. 378-1515Oman, Charles
History
The Art of War in the Middle Ages A.D. 378-1515
Oman, Charles
Military art and science -- History -- Medieval, 500-1500; Military history, Medieval
The attempt to introduce some degree of efficiency into a feudal force
drove monarchs to various expedients. Frederick Barbarossa strove to
enforce discipline by a strict code of ‘Camp Laws;’ an undertaking in
which he won no great success, if we may judge of their observance by
certain recorded incidents. In 1158, for example, Egbert von Buten, a
young Austrian noble, left his post and started off with a thousand
men to endeavour to seize one of the gates of Milan, a presumptuous
violation of orders in which he lost his life. This was only in
accordance with the spirit of the times, and by no means exceptional.
If the stern and imposing personality of the great emperor could not
win obedience, the task was hopeless for weaker rulers. Most monarchs
were driven into the use of another description of troops, inferior
in _morale_ to the feudal force, but more amenable to discipline. The
mercenary comes to the fore in the second half of the twelfth century.
A stranger to all the nobler incentives to valour, an enemy to his God
and his neighbour, the most deservedly hated man in Europe, he was yet
the instrument which kings, even those of the better sort, were obliged
to seek out and cherish. When wars ceased to be mere frontier raids,
and were carried on for long periods at a great distance from the homes
of most of the baronage, it became impossible to rely on the services
of the feudal levy. But how to provide the large sums necessary for
the payment of mercenaries was not always obvious. Notable among the
expedients employed was that of Henry II of England, who substituted
for the personal service of each knight the system of ‘scutage.’ By
this the majority of the tenants of the crown compounded for their
personal service by paying two marks for each knight’s fee. Thus the
king was enabled to pass the seas at the head of a force of mercenaries
who were, for most military purposes, infinitely preferable to the
feudal array[65]. However objectionable the hired foreigner might be,
on the score of his greed and ferocity, he could, at least, be trusted
to stand by his colours as long as he was regularly paid. Every ruler
found him a necessity in time of war, but to the unconstitutional
and oppressive ruler his existence was especially profitable: it was
solely by the lavish use of mercenaries that the warlike nobility could
be held in check. Despotism could only begin when the monarch became
able to surround himself with a strong force of men whose desires
and feelings were alien to those of the nation. The tyrant in modern
Europe, as in ancient Greece, found his natural support in foreign
hired soldiery. King John, when he drew to himself his ‘Routiers,’
‘Brabançons,’ and ‘Satellites,’ was unconsciously imitating Pisistratus
and Polycrates.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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