These were the antecedent technical conditions of a great battle which, in the startling decisiveness of its results, and in the fact that the victors lost no ship, challenges comparison with that of the Nile. The tangled chain of causation now requires to be unravelled by the coolest heads at our disposal, excluding all previous bias, and seeking only to apportion the true relative values of the various factors involved with the single object of securing the sound direction of future naval policy. What part did superior speed play in carrying destruction to the Russian fleet? What guns established the initial superiority of fire and wrought the havoc, moral and material, which ensured victory? What purpose did armour serve, and how did its distribution conform to the needs of the battle? It is upon the answers to such questions as these that our naval policy must depend. Underlying the experience of the battle of Tsu-shima there are undoubtedly principles of general application. It is for us to ascertain those principles, and to apply them as a test to all ship designs and tactical theories. The merit of this little work is that it records the impressions of a naval officer who apparently had no official duties to absorb his attention. Captain Semenoff had also the advantage of being present on board the _Cesarevitch_ at the action of the 10th August 1904, when it was vital to the Japanese to take no great risks. He significantly notes the difference of conditions. At Tsu-shima, Admiral Togo was determined to force a decisive action. Moreover, the Japanese had, meanwhile, improved their fuses. Thus, in the later action, “shells seemed to be pouring upon us incessantly.... It seemed as if these were mines, not shells.... They burst as soon as they touched anything.... No! It was different to the 10th August.” Incidentally the author notes the “portmanteaus” (Japanese 12-inch shell) “curving awkwardly head over heels through the air and falling anyhow on the water.” This shows that some of the Japanese 12-inch guns--numbering only sixteen--were so much worn as to be unable to give adequate rotation to their projectiles, which consequently could only have hit the Russian ships by accident. The _Suvoroff_, where Captain Semenoff’s experiences were gained, was a ship of 13,500 tons, with a continuous armour belt 12 feet broad, tapering in length at the water-line from 8 inches to 6 inches, and vertically from 6 inches to 4 inches above. Her heavy armament consisted of four 12-inch guns in 10-inch turrets, standing upon 10-inch barbettes built up from the armoured deck. The secondary armament of twelve 6-inch guns was mounted in 6-inch turrets standing upon 6-inch barbettes, all built up from the upper deck. Below the 6-inch barbettes were armoured ammunition hoists carried down to the belt level. A main armoured deck (3 to 2 inches) at the water-line level extended all over the ship.