Such was the _Suvoroff_, which was driven out of the line in less than forty minutes, and after being reduced to the hopeless state described by Captain Semenoff, was gratuitously torpedoed by the Japanese. Being the flag-ship of the Commander-in-Chief she was doubtless singled out as a target; but, of her three sister-ships, the _Alexander III._ was sunk by gun fire about five hours after the beginning of the action; the _Borodino_ also sank in five hours, apparently as the result of the explosion of a magazine; and the _Orel_ surrendered on the 28th with main turrets not seriously injured and thick armour not penetrated. The general impression conveyed by Captain Semenoff, and confirmed from other sources, is that the Russian ships were overwhelmed by the volume of the Japanese fire, and that frequency of hitting rather than weight of shells should be the main object. If this conclusion is correct, the principle which guided the British Navy in the days of Nelson--to close to effective range and then deliver the most rapid fire possible--has been strikingly reaffirmed. Effective ranges have increased; but this principle remains unchanged and is probably unchangeable. The trouble which arose from the outbreak of fire on board the _Suvoroff_ and from the wreckage of the bridges and spar-deck, the men killed in the conning tower, the penetration of the armoured deck near the bow, the down-draught of smoke, the estimate of range (“a little more than 20 cables”) at a critical moment--all these points, which present themselves in the narrative, claim attention and careful comparison with other accounts. Captain Semenoff’s impressions of the manœuvring of the fleets may well be somewhat vague; but it is worth collating with other observations. Lastly, the graphic touches of the author show with painful distinctness the terrible strain imposed upon human endurance. Few who read his account of the heroic signalmen “standing silently and outwardly calm,” unwilling to go below the armoured deck, wishing only for orders, and feeling “themselves indispensable to the fight,” will be inclined to accept the recent theory that partly-trained and half-disciplined men are fit to find a place on board ship in modern naval war. Upon a correct understanding of the lessons of Tsu-shima the expenditure of millions of public money and the efficiency of the Navy in the near future must mainly depend. If this simple narrative can, in however small a degree, help us to attain such an understanding, its publication will be abundantly justified. G. S. CLARKE. LONDON, _10th November 1906_. TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE