"In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three CITIES, or republics, the largest were entitled to _three_ votes in the COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to _two_, and the smallest to _one_. The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges and magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was certainly the most delicate species of interference in their internal administration; for if there be anything that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association, says, 'Were I to give a model of an excellent confederate republic, it would be that of Lycia.' Thus we perceive that the distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this enlightened writer, and we shall be led to conclude that they are the novel refinements of an erroneous theory." The important paper just quoted from the "Federalist," is from the gifted pen of James Madison, so long a prominent and leading statesman in the democratic party, and one of the framers of our present government. Had we space we would quote another, equally important, from the same source and upon the same subject. This paper, its pointed facts and its powerful reasoning in favor of a stable Union, such as was contemplated by the present constitution, and against the defects of the old confederation, we commend to the particular attention of the thinking masses of the present democratic party. Although written before the adoption of the existing constitution, and for the express purpose of inducing the people to ratify that constitution, it contains much that is applicable to the present political juncture, inasmuch as the present secession dogmas of South Carolina and of the Calhoun school of politicians are exactly the loose, inefficient principles of that old confederation, and opposed to those of the present constitution. We will here make an extract from another paper of the "Federalist," to show how Jay, Madison and Hamilton regarded the defects of that confederation--to illustrate, with clearness, the _absolute necessity_ of the adoption of our present constitution, considering, as they did, that it would constitute an efficient remedy for those defects: "CONCERNING THE DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION, IN RELATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGISLATION FOR THE STATES IN THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES.