Throughout the morning Admiral Carden concentrated his bombardment upon these forts at long range, and they made no reply. Hoping that he had silenced or utterly destroyed them, he advanced six ships to closer range in the afternoon, and then the reply came in earnest, though the shooting was poor. At sunset he withdrew the ships, though Kum Kali was still firing. In evidence, he admitted that “the result of the day’s action showed apparently that the effect of long range bombardment by direct fire on modern earthwork forts is slight.”[63] It was a lesson repeated time after time throughout the campaign. The big naval shells threw up stones and earth as from volcanoes, and caused great alarm. But the alarm was temporary, and the effect, whether on earthworks or trenches, usually disappointing. For naval guns, constructed to strike visible objects at long range with marvellous accuracy, have too flat a trajectory for the plunging fire (as of howitzers) which devastates earthworks and trenches. It was with heavy howitzers that the Germans destroyed the forts of Liége, Namur, and Antwerp, and, owing to this obvious difference in the weapons employed, Mr. Churchill’s expectation of crushing the Dardanelles defences by the big guns of the _Queen Elizabeth_ and the _Inflexible_ was frustrated.[64] Nevertheless, after a few days of driving rain and heavy sea (a common event at this season, which might have been anticipated), Admiral Carden renewed the bombardment on February 25, employing the _Queen Elizabeth_, _Irresistible_, _Agamemnon_, and _Gaulois_. The _Queen Elizabeth_, firing beyond the enemy’s range, assisted in silencing the powerful batteries on Cape Helles, and though the _Agamemnon_ was severely struck at about 11,000 yards range, the subsidiary ships _Cornwallis_, _Vengeance_, _Triumph_, _Albion_, _Suffren_, and _Charlemagne_ stood in closer, and by the evening compelled all the outer forts to cease fire. Next day landing-parties of marines were put ashore to complete their destruction; which they did, though at Kum Kali they were driven back to their boats with some loss. The story that marines had tea at Krithia and climbed Achi Baba for the view--places soon to acquire such ill-omened fame--is mythical. But certainly they met with no opposition on the Peninsula, and if a large military force had then been available, the gallant but appalling events of the landing two months later would never have occurred. Had not the War Council persisted in the design of a solely naval attack, even after their resolve had begun to waver, a large military force might have been available, either then, or to co-operate with a similar naval movement only a week or two later. [Sidenote: SUBSEQUENT NAVAL ACTIONS]