The evolution of general ideasRibot, Th. (Théodule)
Science
The evolution of general ideas
Ribot, Th. (Théodule)
Abstraction; Imagination
The other biography—from which we make a few brief extracts—may be taken
as the type of an intelligent and curious deaf-mute. He was not placed
in an institution until he was eleven years old. During his childhood he
accompanied his father on long expeditions, and his curiosity was aroused
as to the origin of things: of animals and vegetables, of the earth, the
sun, the moon, the stars (at eight or nine years). He began to understand
(from five years) how children were descended from parents, and how
animals were propagated. This may have been the origin of the question
he put to himself: whence came the first man, first animal, first plant,
etc. He supposed at first that primæval man was born from the trunk of
a tree, then rejected this hypothesis as absurd, then sought in various
directions without finding. He respected the sun and moon, believed that
they went under the earth in the West, and traversed a long tunnel to
reappear in the East, etc. One day, on hearing violent peals of thunder,
he interrogated his brother, who pointed to the sky, and simulated the
zigzag of the lightning with his finger; whence he concluded for the
existence of a celestial giant whose voice was thunder. Puerile as they
may be, are these cosmogonic, theological conceptions inferior to those
of the aborigines of Oceanica and of the savage regions of South America,
who, nevertheless, have a vocal idiom, a rudimentary language?
To sum up. That which dominates among the better gifted, is the
creative imagination: it is the culminating point of their intellectual
development. Their primitive curiosity does not seem inferior to that
of average humanity; but since they cannot get beyond representation by
images they lack an instrument of intellectual progress.
ANALYTICAL GESTURES.
The question of signs is so closely allied to our subject—the evolution
of general ideas—that we must insist upon the language of gesture as
an instrument of analysis, before going on to speech—of which it is an
imperfect substitute.
St. George Mivart (_Lessons from Nature_) gives the following as a
complete classification of every species of sign, omitting those that are
written:
1. Sounds which are neither articulate nor rational, such as cries of
pain, or the murmur of a mother to her infant.
2. Sounds which are articulate but not rational, such as the talk of
parrots, or of certain idiots, who will repeat, without comprehending,
every phrase they hear.
3. Sounds which are rational but not articulate, such as the inarticulate
ejaculations by which we sometimes express assent to or dissent from
given propositions.
4. Sounds which are both rational and articulate, constituting true
“speech.”
5. Gestures which do not answer to rational conceptions, but are merely
the manifestations of emotions and feelings.
6. Gestures which do answer to rational conceptions, and are therefore
“external” but not “oral” manifestations of the _verbum mentale_.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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