willing to corrupt the members, and that even should any individuals of the representative body betray their trust, the period will soon arrive, in which they may elect more worthy representatives?—It has been asserted that this is contrary to the nature of our boasted constitution; but, if the system be imperfect in this one particular, why not amend so material a defect?—Or is the constitution immutable but for the benefit of the Aristocracy, whilst every change is inadmissible, that will protect the people at large in the due enjoyment of their rights and privileges?—Is the change from a Triennial, to a Septennial Parliament (brought about by the representative body, in direct violation of their constituents’ rights;) is this change, it may be asked, less hazardous than one which purposes only to guard against the corruption, and to correct those abuses which have almost imperceptibly crept into the representation?—As the existence of corruption in the representative is too probable, so is its prevalence in the constituent body too notorious:—election by ballot, it has been supposed, will provide a remedy against this evil;—it will remain unknown to the candidates for whom the voters may poll, the application of bribery therefore will be ineffectual, as, notwithstanding his acceptance of a bribe, the voter may still poll, according to his inclination or his conscience, without the fear of a discovery. In regard to the universal suffrage, it must be acknowledged that every individual, in the state, has an interest in the proper administration of its affairs, and that Government will, sometimes, need the support, even of its meanest subjects; if, therefore, they are interested in, and contribute to the support of Government, they are entitled to a participation in its privileges;—the privilege they claim is the Elective Franchise, and as the lower house is called the Commons House of Parliament, why should not the members, instead of representing property, be in fact the representatives of the People?—At the same time such material changes adopted on a sudden, might produce tumult and disorder, they might occasion convulsions, attended with far more dreadful effects, than the evils they purpose to remedy;—but when a minister acknowledges corruption in his own conduct;—when the sale of Boroughs is notoriously practised;—when, in some instances, the representatives of a County are returned by the influence alone of a few powerful individuals;—when the late convictions, in the House of Commons, for bribery, prove that it is frequently, if not generally practised by the candidates for seats in that house, and that it has a pernicious influence upon the constituent body;—it cannot be disputed, but that some remedy ought instantly to be applied, in order to eradicate, or at least to check the wide spreading infection.