Many portions of them are, however, now obsolete; and Canon 36 and the last words of Canon 102 have been superseded by new canons made in 1865-66 and 1888. The Canons of 1640 were passed after the dissolution of Parliament, which, according to the custom of the realm, put an end also to the existence of Convocation, and they have no legal force.[4] 4. Much discussion has arisen upon a fourth source of Church law, namely, the decisions of our ecclesiastical courts. It is important to draw a clear distinction between legislative and judicial functions. A court, whether ecclesiastical or civil, has nothing to do with enacting laws. Its province is confined to interpreting them, when their meaning is obscure or disputed. No doubt, in the course of this interpretation, it will sometimes make law by deciding in a particular way a point on which the legislature has left the matter in doubt, and has not itself clearly laid down the law. Many questions affecting the clergy and the Church have, in fact, been thus determined by our civil as well as by our ecclesiastical tribunals. But if one of our civil courts, in interpreting the civil law, delivers a decision which does not commend itself to the common sense of the nation, it is recognised that the remedy lies not in altering the constitution of the court and endeavouring to obtain a fresh legal decision which shall upset the other, but in obtaining an Act of Parliament expressly overruling the unsatisfactory decision. If this is not done, the law may have been technically judge-made, but it is acquiesced in and assented to by Parliament and the nation. The same principle applies to the decisions of ecclesiastical courts. The natural way of getting rid of an obnoxious decision is not by fresh adjudication, but by legislation. Until it has been reversed by one or other of these means, the decision of a court, which _de facto_ possesses ecclesiastical jurisdiction, is binding upon the Church as part of her law for the time being. We have somewhat lost sight of this principle, owing to the extreme difficulty of obtaining any definition or alteration of Church law by a legislative process. But the true remedy lies in a healthy revival of the exercise of ecclesiastical legislation, and not in an endeavour to make the ecclesiastical judicature, whether as now existing or after a reform of the courts, discharge legislative functions which are wholly outside its proper province.