The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
3. In the foregoing remarks, which are intended to
be purely preliminary, we have not been able altogether to
avoid some reference to a subjective element, viz. the degree
of our certainty or belief about the things which we are
supposed to contemplate. The reader may be aware that
by some writers this element is regarded as the subject-matter
of the science. Hence it will have to be discussed
in a future chapter. As however I do not agree with the
opinion of the writers just mentioned, at least as regards
treating this element as one of primary importance, no
further allusion will be made to it here, but we will pass on
at once to a more minute investigation of that distinctive
characteristic of certain classes of things which was introduced
to notice in the last section.
In these classes of things, which are those with which
Probability is concerned, the fundamental conception which
the reader has to fix in his mind as clearly as possible, is, I
take it, that of a series. But it is a series of a peculiar kind,
one of which no better compendious description can be given
than that which is contained in the statement that it combines
individual irregularity with aggregate regularity. This
is a statement which will probably need some explanation.
Let us recur to an example of the kind already alluded to,
selecting one which shall be in accordance with experience.
Some children will not live to thirty. Now if this proposition
is to be regarded as a purely indefinite or, as it would
be termed in logic, 'particular' proposition, no doubt the
notion of a series does not obviously present itself in connection
with it. It contains a statement about a certain
unknown proportion of the whole, and that is all. But it is
not with these purely indefinite propositions that we shall
be concerned. Let us suppose the statement, on the contrary,
to be of a numerical character, and to refer to a given
proportion of the whole, and we shall then find it difficult to
exclude the notion of a series. We shall find it, I think,
impossible to do so as soon as we set before us the aim of
obtaining accurate, or even moderately correct inferences.
What, for instance, is the meaning of the statement that
two new-born children in three fail to attain the age of
sixty-three? It certainly does not declare that in any given
batch of, say, thirty, we shall find just twenty that fail:
whatever might be the strict meaning of the words, this
is not the import of the statement. It rather contemplates
our examination of a large number, of a long succession
of instances, and states that in such a succession we shall
find a numerical proportion, not indeed fixed and accurate at
first, but which tends in the long run to become so. In
every kind of example with which we shall be concerned we
shall find this reference to a large number or succession
of objects, or, as we shall term it, _series_ of them.
A few additional examples may serve to make this plain.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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