The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics — John Shaqi
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
13. Here then are series apparently of two different
kinds. They are alike in their initial irregularity, alike in
their subsequent regularity; it is in what we may term
their ultimate form that they begin to diverge from each
other. The one tends without any irregular variation
towards a fixed numerical proportion in its uniformity; in
the other the uniformity is found at last to fluctuate, and to
fluctuate, it may be, in a manner utterly irreducible to rule.
As this chapter is intended to be little more than explanatory
and illustrative of the foundations of the science,
the remark may be made here (for which subsequent justification
will be offered) that it is in the case of series of the
former kind only that we are able to make anything which
can be interpreted into strict scientific inferences. We shall
be able however in a general way to see the kind and extent
of error that would be committed if, in any example, we were
to substitute an imaginary series of the former kind for any
actual series of the latter kind which experience may present
to us. The two series are of course to be as alike as possible
in all respects, except that the variable uniformity has been
replaced by a fixed one. The difference then between them
would not appear in the initial stage, for in that stage the
distinctive characteristics of the series of Probability are not
apparent; all is there irregularity, and it would be as impossible
to show that they were alike as that they were
different; we can only say generally that each shows the
same kind of irregularity. Nor would it appear in the next
subsequent stage, for the real variability of the uniformity
has not for some time scope to make itself perceived. It
would only be in what we have called the ultimate stage,
when we suppose the series to extend for a very long time,
that the difference would begin to make itself felt.[3] The
proportion of persons, for example, who die each year at the
age of six months is, when the numbers examined are on a
small scale, utterly irregular; it becomes however regular
when the numbers examined are on a larger scale; but if we
continued our observation for a very great length of time, or
over a very great extent of country, we should find this
regularity itself changing in an irregular way. The substitution
just mentioned is really equivalent to saying, Let
us assume that the regularity is fixed and permanent. It is
making a hypothesis which may not be altogether consistent
with fact, but which is forced upon us for the purpose of
securing precision of statement and definition.
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