The magazine of history with notes and queries, Vol. II, No. 4, October 1905 — John Shaqi
The magazine of history with notes and queries, Vol. II, No. 4, October 1905Various
History
The magazine of history with notes and queries, Vol. II, No. 4, October 1905
Various
History -- Periodicals; United States -- History -- Periodicals
He continues: “You know me well enough I think, to understand that I
will never submit if I can help it. The court of inquiry, which you
inform me has been ordered, will amount to nothing for several reasons.
It is too late, so far as I am concerned. Its proceedings, I presume,
will be secret, as in Harper’s Ferry business. The principal witnesses
are here with me, and I myself should be present. The Mississippi River
closes by the 25th of November [Note that date!]; frequently sooner
than that. It is then next to impossible to get away from this place. A
journey through the snow of 200 miles is required to communicate with
any railroad.”[24]
And on the very day which Pope had named, November 25, 1862,
General-in-Chief Halleck issued his order for the court-martial of
Fitz-John Porter, and issued his report certifying to the efficiency
of General Pope, thus avoiding the court of inquiry which Pope had
threatened to demand.
Such a court, if honestly conducted, would have laid bare the truth,
and shown to the world that Halleck himself had prevented the
reinforcements from reaching Pope, caused the defeat of Second Bull
Run, imperiled the national capital, and opened the door of Maryland to
Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee.
This conclusion is supported both by Halleck’s official report and by
his testimony before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. In
the former, he says: “Had the Army of the Potomac arrived a few days
earlier, the rebel army could have been easily defeated and, perhaps,
destroyed.” His testimony before that committee, on March 11, 1863.[25]
“Question. To what do you attribute the disastrous result of General
Pope’s campaign?
Answer. I think our troops were not sufficiently concentrated so as to
be all brought into action on the field of battle; and there was great
delay in getting reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac to General
Pope’s assistance.
Question. To what is that delay attributable?
Answer. Partly, I think, to accidents, and partly to a want of
energy in the troops, or their officers, in getting forward to
General Pope’s assistance. I could not say that that was due to any
particular individual. It may have resulted from the officers generally
not feeling the absolute necessity of great haste in re-enforcing
General Pope. The troops, after they started from the Peninsula, were
considerably delayed by heavy storms that came on at that time.”
[_Note._--General Halleck has not told that committee, what his own
letters and telegrams conclusively prove, that the principal delay of
those reinforcements was due to his own wilfully false telegrams to
Generals McClellan, Burnside, and Porter, and that he also prevented
General Franklin and the Sixth Army Corps from reaching Pope from
Alexandria by refusing to provide transportation. The next question and
answer fixes the blame directly upon Halleck himself]:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account