The so-called law-makers are therefore not law-makers at all, in the sense of being originators of the law; they are rather agents who come up from their respective districts under instructions. Such agents are simply temporary representatives of the citizens of their respective districts, directly responsible to them and charged with no duty other than that of putting their will into effect. The agent or delegate should therefore approach very conservatively any matter upon which the will of his constituency has not been satisfactorily determined. It is, then, apparent that the influence which makes or which alters the law is a force exerted from without. No change in the law can be properly or safely brought about except through the pressure of public sentiment. The need for the law must be first felt by the people and the demand for it made before the legislator is warranted in acting. The representative would otherwise become a presumptive usurper, afflicting the people with statutes for which there was no public demand; and such laws, so improperly obtained, would be without the support of public sentiment and would be liable to repeal. Hence it is entirely clear that if the existing law prove to be unjust or defective, the people must be brought to see and appreciate such injustice or inadequacy and to demand the requisite modification. This contention can, as it seems to me, not be gainsaid. It is respectfully urged that no other method of securing wise changes in the law can be properly pursued under democratic institutions. To hold otherwise is to take issue with the wisdom of democracy itself, and with so rash a champion the writer has no spear to break. Indeed, he makes this explanation with immense unwillingness, as he feels that he should not be required to defend a truth so evident. It is like demonstrating gravely that the earth is round and that sun light is an energy. Yet he is advised that attention should be called to this matter, lest the thoughtless condemn upon a hearing _ex-parte_. Indeed, even after the punishment of _la peine forte et dure_ is gone out these many hundred years, the good citizen will hardly hold that one guiltless who stands dumb while hidden evils assail. If men about their affairs were passing to and fro across a great bridge, and one should discover that certain planks in its flooring were defective, would he do ill if he pointed them out to his fellows? If men labored in the shops and traded in the market confident in the security of their city's wall, and one should perceive that the wall was honeycombed with holes, could he stand dumb and escape the stigma of being a traitor? The law makes little difference in the degree of moral turpitude between the _suppressio veri_ and the _suggestio falsi_. Both are grievous wrongs. The duty of the individual to the state is imperative. He cannot evade it and continue to regard himself as a worthy citizen.