(4) This leads to a discussion of Art. In Art, it seems, we are brought into relation with objects of which it may be said: (a) That they have, by their essence, that Good which is called Beauty. (b) That, in a certain sense, they may be said to be eternal. (c) That, though complex, they are such that their parts are necessarily connected, in the sense that each is essential to the total Beauty. On the other hand, the Good of Art suffers from the defects: (a) That outside and independent of Art there is the 'real world,' so that this Good is only a partial one. (b) That Art is a creation of man, whereas we seem to demand, for a thing that shall be perfectly good, that it shall be so of its own nature, without our intervention. (5) It is suggested that perhaps we may find the Good we seek in knowledge. This raises the difficulty that various views are held as to the nature of knowledge. Of these, two are discussed: (a) the view that knowledge is 'the description and summing up in brief formulæ, of the routine of our perceptions.' It is questioned whether there is really much Good in such an activity. And it is argued that, whatever Good it may have, it cannot be _the_ Good, seeing that knowledge may be, and frequently is, knowledge of Bad. (b) the view that knowledge consists in the perception of 'necessary connections,' Viewed from the standpoint of Good, this seems to be open to the same objection as (a). But, further, it is argued that the perpetual contemplation of necessary relations among ideas does not satisfy our conception of the Good; but that we require an element analogous somehow to that of sense, though not, like sense, unintelligible and obscure. (6) Finally, it is suggested that in our relation to other persons, where the relation takes the form of love, we may perhaps find something that comes nearer than any other of our experiences to being absolutely good. For in that relation, it is urged, we are in contact (a) with objects, not 'mere ideas.' (b) with objects that are good in themselves and (c) intelligible and (d) harmonious to our own nature. It is objected that love, so conceived, is (a) rarely, perhaps never, experienced. (b) in any case, is neither eternal nor universal. This is admitted; but it is maintained that the best love we know comes nearer than anything else to what we might conceive to be absolutely good. III. The question is now raised: if 'the Good' be so conceived, is it not clearly unattainable? The answer to this question seems to depend on whether or not we believe in personal immortality. The following points are therefore discussed: (a) Whether personal immortality is conceivable? (b) Whether a belief in it is essential to a reasonable pursuit of Good? On these points no dogmatic solution is offered; and the Dialogue closes with the description of a dream. BOOK I.