3. “Good” = “desirable” or “reasonably desired”: as applied to conduct, the term does not convey so definite a dictate as “right,” and it is not confined to the strictly voluntary. 109-113 4. There are many other things commonly judged to be good: but reflection shows that nothing is ultimately good except some mode of human existence. 113-115 BOOK II EGOISM CHAPTER I THE PRINCIPLE AND METHOD OF EGOISM 1. The Principle of Egoistic Hedonism is the widely accepted proposition that the rational end of conduct for each individual is the Maximum of his own Happiness or Pleasure. 119-121 2. There are several methods of seeking this end: but we may take as primary that which proceeds by Empirical-reflective comparison of pleasures. 121-122 CHAPTER II EMPIRICAL HEDONISM 1. In this method it is assumed that all pleasures sought and pains shunned are commensurable; and can be arranged in a certain scale of preferableness: 123-125 2. pleasure being defined as “feeling apprehended as desirable by the sentient individual at the time of feeling it.” 125-130 Note 130 CHAPTER III EMPIRICAL HEDONISM (_continued_) 1. To get a clearer view of this method, let us consider objections tending to show its inherent impracticability: as, first, that “pleasure as feeling cannot be conceived,” and that a “sum of pleasures is intrinsically unmeaning”: 131-134 2. that transient pleasures cannot satisfy; and that the predominance of self-love tends to defeat its own end: 134-138 3. that the habit of introspectively comparing pleasures is unfavourable to pleasure: 138-140 4. that any quantitative comparison of pleasures and pains is vague and uncertain, even in the case of our own past experiences: 140-144 5. that it also tends to be different at different times: especially through variations in the present state of the person performing the comparison: 144-146 6. that, in fact, the supposed definite commensurability of pleasures is an unverifiable assumption: 146-147 7. that there is a similar liability to error in appropriating the experience of others; and in inferring future pleasures from past. 147-150 CHAPTER IV OBJECTIVE HEDONISM AND COMMON SENSE