III. The objects of will or simple volition are referable to two classes,--objects to be obtained,--and actions to be performed to others;--and these are connected with two distinct mental conditions, which exist previously to the act of volition. In regard to objects to be obtained, this mental condition is _Desire_;--in regard to actions towards others, it is _Affection_. The Desires and Affections, therefore, hold a place in the mind previous to volition. From one of them originates the mental state which, under certain regulations, leads to volition, or to our willing a certain act. The act, which is then the result of the volition, consists either in certain efforts towards attaining the object desired,--or in certain conduct towards other men, amusing out of our affections or mental feelings towards them. The Desires and Affections, therefore, may be considered as the primary or moving powers, from which our actions proceed. In connection with them we have to keep in view another principle, which has an extensive influence on our conduct in regard to both these classes of emotions. This is _Self-love_;--which leads us to seek our own protection, comfort, and advantage. It is a sound and legitimate principle of action when kept in its proper place;--when allowed to usurp an undue influence, it degenerates into selfishness; and it then interferes in a material degree with the exercise of the affections, or, in other words, with our duty to other men. IV. We have next to attend to the fact, that every desire is not followed by actual volition towards obtaining the object;--and that every affection does not lead to the conduct which might flow from it. Thus a man may feel a desire which, after consideration, he determines not to gratify. Another may experience an affection, and not act upon it;--he may feel benevolence or friendship, and yet act, in the particular case, with cold selfishness;--or he may feel the impulse of anger, and yet conduct himself with forbearance. When, therefore, we go another step backwards in the chain of moral sequences, our attention is directed to certain principles by which the determination is actually decided,--either according to the desire or affection which is present to the mind, or in opposition to it. This brings us to a subject of the utmost practical importance:--and the principles, which thus decide the determination of the mind, are referable to two heads.