What, then, I venture to assert is, that the People of Athens has no difficulty in recognising which of its citizens are of the better sort and which the opposite. (26) And so recognising those who are serviceable and advantageous (27) to itself, even though they be base, the People loves them; but the good folk they are disposed rather to hate. This virtue of theirs, the People holds, is not engrained in their nature for any good to itself, but rather for its injury. In direct opposition to this, there are some persons who, being (28) born of the People, are yet by natural instinct not commoners. For my part I pardon the People its own democracy, as, indeed, it is pardonable in any one to do good to himself. (29) But the man who, not being himself one of the People, prefers to live in a state democratically governed rather than in an oligarchical state may be said to smooth his own path towards iniquity. He knows that a bad man has a better chance of slipping through the fingers of justice in a democratic than in an oligarchical state. (26) Or, "and which are good for nothing." (27) Or,"its own friends and supporters." (28) Reading {ontes} or (if {gnontes}), "who, recognising the nature of the People, have no popular leaning." Gutschmidt conj. {enioi egguoi ontes}, i.e. Pericles. (29) On the principle that "the knee is nearer than the shin-bone," {gonu knemes}, or, as we say, "charity begins at home." III I repeat that my position concerning the polity of the Athenians is this: the type (1) of polity is not to my taste, but given that a democratic form of government has been agreed upon, they do seem to me to go the right way to preserve the democracy by the adoption of the particular type (2) which I have set forth. (1) Or, "manner." (2) Or, "manner."