The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and DeweyGeyer, Denton Loring
Philosophy
The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey
Geyer, Denton Loring
Dewey, John, 1859-1952; James, William, 1842-1910; Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914; Pragmatism
Some actual delusions which were not readily subjected to tests have
been long useful in this way. "For instance, basing ourselves on
Lafcadio Hearn, we might quite admit that the opinions summed up under
the title 'Ancestor-Worship' had been ... 'exactly what was required'
by the former inhabitants of Japan". "It was good for primitive man to
believe that dead ancestors required to be fed and honored ... because
it induced savages to bring up their offspring instead of letting it
perish. But although it was useful to hold that opinion, the opinion
was false". "Mankind has always wanted, perhaps always required, and
certainly made itself, a stock of delusions and sophisms".[10]
[10] Lee: Vital Lies, vol. 1, pp. 11, 31, 33, 72.
Perhaps we would all agree that the belief that 'God is on our side'
has been useful to the tribe holding it. If has increased zeal and
fighting efficiency tremendously. But since God can't be on both
sides, the belief of one party to the conflict is untrue, no matter
how useful. To believe that (beneficial) tribal customs are enforced
by the tribal gods is useful, but if the tribal gods are non-existent
the belief is false. The beautiful imaginings of poets are sometimes
useful in minimizing and disguising the hard and ugly reality, but
when they will not test out they cannot be said because of their
beauty or desirability to be true.
We must conclude then, that some delusions are useful. And we may go
on and question James' identification of truth and utility from
another point of view. Instead of agreeing that true ideas and useful
ideas are the same, we have shown that some useful ideas are false:
but the converse is also demonstrable, that some true ideas are
useless.
There are formulas in pure science which are of no use to anyone
outside the science because their practical bearings, if such there
be, have not yet been discovered, and are of no use to the scientist
himself because, themselves the products of deduction, they as yet
suggest nothing that can be developed farther from them. While these
formulas may later be found useful in either of these senses--for
'practical demands' outside the science, or as a means to something
else within the science--they are now already true quite apart from
utility, because they will test out by fulfilling expectations.
Knowledge that is not useful is most striking in relation to 'vice'.
One may have a true idea as to how to lie and cheat, may know what
cheating is and how it is done, and yet involve both himself and
others in most _un_satisfactory consequences. The person who is
attempting to stop the use of liquor, and who to this end has located
in a 'dry' district, may receive correct information as to the
location of a 'blind-tiger'--information which while true may bring
about his downfall. Knowledge about any form of vice, true knowledge
that can be tested out, may upon occasion be harmful to any extent we
like.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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