The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey — John Shaqi
The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and DeweyGeyer, Denton Loring
Philosophy
The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey
Geyer, Denton Loring
Dewey, John, 1859-1952; James, William, 1842-1910; Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914; Pragmatism
We may conclude this section by citing a paragraph which will show the
fallacious reasoning by which James came to identify the truth and the
utility of ideas. At one point in replying to a criticism he says: "I
can conceive no other objective _content_ to the notion of an ideally
perfect truth than that of penetration into [a completely
satisfactory] terminus, nor can I conceive that the notion would ever
have grown up, or that true ideas would ever have been sorted out from
false or idle ones, save for the greater sum of satisfactions,
intellectual or practical, which the truer ones brought with them. Can
we imagine a man absolutely satisfied with an idea and with all his
relations to his other ideas and to his sensible experiences, who
should yet _not_ take its content as a true account of reality? The
_matter_ of the true is thus absolutely identical with the matter of
the satisfactory. You may put either word first in your way of
talking; but leave out that whole notion of satisfactory working or
leading (which is the essence of my pragmatic account) and call truth
a static, logical relation, independent even of possible leadings or
satisfactions, and it seems to me that you cut all ground from under
you". (Meaning of Truth, p. 160).[11]
[11] It is interesting to see that Peirce had the
following comment to make in 1878 upon the utility of truth.
"Logicality in regard to practical matters is the most
useful quality an animal can possess, and might, therefore,
result from the action of natural selection; but outside of
these it is probably of more advantage to the animal to have
his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions,
independently of their truth; and thus upon impractical
subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious
tendency of thought". (From the first article in the series
"Illustrations of the Logic of Science", Popular Science
Monthly, vol. 12, p. 3).
Now it is to be observed that this paragraph contains at least three
logical fallacies. In the first sentence there is a false assumption,
namely that 'all that survives is valuable'. 'Then', we are given to
understand, 'since true ideas survive, they must be valuable'. No
biologist would agree to this major premise. 'Correlation' preserves
many things that are not valuable, as also do other factors.
In the second sentence there is an implied false conversion. The
second sentence says, in substance, that all true ideas are
satisfactory (valuable). This is supposed to prove the assertion of
the first sentence, namely, that all satisfactory (valuable) ideas are
true.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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