The Reality of War: A Companion to ClausewitzMurray, Stewart Lygon
Philosophy
The Reality of War: A Companion to Clausewitz
Murray, Stewart Lygon
Clausewitz, Carl von, 1780-1831. Vom Kriege; Military art and science; War
"_This has happened times without end, and it shows that a certain
knowledge of the nature of war is essential to the management of
political intercourse._"
THE WAR MINISTER
"Before going further we must guard ourselves against a false
interpretation of which this is very susceptible. We do not mean to
say that this acquaintance with the nature of war is the _principal_
qualification for a war minister. Elevation, superiority of mind,
strength of character, these are the principal qualifications which he
must possess; a knowledge of war may be supplied in one way or another."
POLICY AND THE MEANS TO CARRY OUT THAT POLICY MUST HARMONIZE
"_If war is to harmonize entirely with the political views, and policy
to accommodate itself to the means available for war_, there is only
one alternative to be recommended when the statesman and soldier are
not combined in one person (note, as William of Orange, Frederick
the Great, or Napoleon), which is to make the chief commander an
_ex-officio_ member of the Cabinet, that he may take part in its
councils and decisions on important occasions."
"The influence of any military man except the general-in-chief in the
Cabinet is extremely dangerous; it very seldom leads to able, vigorous
action."
REFLECTIONS
We shall conclude this chapter with a few reflections on the preceding
dicta of Clausewitz, with which it is hoped that the reader will agree.
Firstly, then, it is clearly apparent that war is subordinate to
policy, is an instrument of policy, is a part of policy, just as much
as diplomatic negotiations are a part of policy.
Secondly, a statesman, however good at peaceful administration he may
be, who is ignorant of war is, therefore, ignorant of one part of
his profession; that part which deals with the preparing, ordering,
guiding, and controlling of war. As Clausewitz says, "it is an
_indispensable supposition_ that policy knows the instrument it is
going to use." It is a mistake to suppose, when diplomatic relations
between two States cease, and war breaks out, that therefore the
political negotiations cease, for they do not, but are merely continued
in another form--in the form of war. The statesman still retains
control, and uses the military events as they occur to attain his
object. He is still responsible for the success of the warlike, as well
as of the peaceful, policy of the nation.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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