“In this war the staff work was not always successful. The troops often received orders too late, and time was wasted waiting for their receipt before commencing a move. Units arriving at night on the positions allotted to them did not always find the officers who should have been waiting their arrival to guide them. Officers in command of troops were often not informed by the staff as to the enemy’s strength and dispositions, or as to our own neighbouring columns. Lack of information was the principal cause of our disasters; we sometimes attacked in entire ignorance of the enemy’s strength and dispositions, and even partially so of our own. “As an example of what our troops can do in an attack may be quoted the capture of Kars; it is a very instructive case. Though the weak field-works of Plevna resisted our efforts for five months, at Kars neither strong parapets nor deep ditches could check our onslaught. Our gallant Caucasians advanced on the fortress by night; they were well led, and always had a body of scouts skilfully thrown out in front, and they captured strongholds that had been termed ‘impregnable’ with great bravery. “In the defence our troops have always fought well. Let us remember the defence of the Shipka Pass, and imitate it.” After a short review of our errors in the Turkish War, I enumerated those which were still noticeable in our peace manœuvres. As operations developed the enemy’s peculiarities became as well known as our own, so I was able in August, September, October, and December, 1904, to issue supplementary instructions. Notwithstanding the number of our cavalry, and what our scouts had been able to do, we had not ascertained the general dispositions and strength of the enemy. The information brought in by spies was exaggerated and unreliable. The result was that, when we had carried out any offensive operations, we had advanced without knowing anything of the enemy. My instructions ran: _Instructions issued in August._ “In our attacks we have started the advance too rapidly, without strengthening positions already occupied, and without full artillery co-operation, and we have stopped the action at a period when we still had large numbers both in the general and regimental reserves. In retirements we have withdrawn to positions previously occupied by us without having taken steps to hold our ground on any of them, which preparation would not only have greatly assisted the retirement itself, but, what was far more important, would have enabled us to renew the attack. “Another point is, that many of our defensive positions have not corresponded to the numbers, when extended, told off to defend them. Nevertheless, the enemy’s frontal attacks, even if we hold quite chance positions, usually fail, and we have been obliged to abandon our ground owing to the turning movements which their superior numbers have made possible.