The theatre of war in Manchuria presented many peculiarities of climate, topography, and inhabitants. It was unlike any of the “probable” theatres of operations we had studied, and was, therefore, quite new to the troops who came from European Russia. The Japanese were not only new and practically unknown foes, but the nature of the information that we did possess about them tended to show our great superiority, and therefore incited us to contempt. The existing edition of our “Field Service Regulations” was obsolete, and the revised edition was still in the Press. Special instructions, therefore, had to be issued, in order to assist our troops to grapple with the entirely strange conditions under which they were placed. These were compiled and printed under my direction, and distributed to officers in command of all units, from companies and squadrons upwards, and to all chief staff-officers. In them I emphasized the necessity of getting to know something about the enemy, enumerated their strong and weak points, and drew attention to their patriotism and traditional indifference to death. I stated that their strong points predominated, and that in the Japanese we should find a very powerful opponent, even when reckoned by European standards. I continued: “It is most important that in the first engagements, in which they will certainly be in superior strength, we should not give the Japanese the satisfaction of victory, for that will only still further elevate their spirit. “No particular or new tactics need be adopted against our present enemy, but we must not repeat the mistakes in manœuvring which cost us so dear in the Turkish War of 1877–78.” I then mentioned the causes of our reverses at Plevna, and commented in detail on the most important. After capturing Nicopolis, our troops moved on Plevna in ignorance of the strength and dispositions of the enemy. As far as obtaining this information was concerned, our cavalry was not well handled. In the first fight at Plevna (July 20, 1877) we attacked with too few men and in detail. We did the same in the fights of July 31 and September 12, but to an even greater extent, and the attacks were carried out in too dense a formation, were not sufficiently prepared by fire-effect, and our own numerous cavalry and that of the Roumanians did practically nothing. The attacks on September 10 and 11, 1877, failed because our troops were badly distributed and untrained. I attached an appreciation of the work of our troops in the Turkish War as follows: