The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
“In the report which will be sent in from the Headquarter
Staff, the conclusion arrived at after a careful appreciation
of the resources of both nations is the same as that reached
two years ago—namely, that in the event of war with Japan,
we should act on the defensive; that the concentration
and general distribution of our troops should remain the
same; that although we may move troops on to the line
Mukden-Liao-yang-Hsiu-yen, we cannot hold our ground in
Southern Manchuria in the first period of the war if that
region be invaded by the whole Japanese army. We should
therefore still count upon Port Arthur being cut off for a
considerable period, and in order to avoid defeat in detail,
should withdraw towards Harbin until reinforcements from
Russia enable us to assume the offensive. But I may add that,
while accepting the same plan of operations as we did two
years ago, we can now have far greater confidence in the
issue of a struggle. Our fleet is stronger than the Japanese,
and as reinforcements will arrive now more quickly than they
could have formerly, it will take less time for us to be in a
position to advance.”
In a memorandum by the Chief of the Headquarter Staff, submitted to me
on February 12, 1904—_i.e._, a few days after the enemy had attacked
our fleet at Port Arthur—General Sakharoff described the Japanese
intentions as follows:
“The Japanese plan appears to be—
“1. To inflict a crushing blow upon our fleet so as to paralyze
its activity once and for all, and thus guarantee freedom of
movement to their transports. To attain this end they have not
hesitated to attack us before the declaration of war (_vide_
the night operations of February 8 and 9). The transfer to
them by the British of Wei-hai-wei also has given them an
advantageous naval base right on the flank of any operations
undertaken by our squadron.
“2. To capture Port Arthur in order to attain the same
object—the destruction of our fleet.
“3. To advance on and capture Harbin, so as to isolate the
Pri-Amur district from the rest of Russia, and to destroy the
railway.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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