CHAPTER XII Summary of the war 177–204 CHAPTER XIII Introduction and conclusion to Volume III. 205–305 APPENDIX I The Royal Timber Company 306–313 APPENDIX II Breakdown of the unit organization and distribution 314–335 INDEX 336–348 ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOL. II. GENERAL KUROPATKIN REVIEWING HIS TROOPS _Frontispiece_ OPPOSITE PAGE GENERAL LINIEVITCH 18 GENERAL BARON KITEN NOGI 40 GENERAL GRIPPENBERG 100 FIELD-MARSHAL MARQUIS IWAO OYAMA 206 MAPS SKETCH-MAP OF MANCHURIA, SHOWING MAIN PLACES ALONG RAILWAY SOUTH OF HARBIN 27 DIAGRAM SHOWING THE POSITION OF THE THEATRE OF WAR RELATIVELY TO RUSSIA AND JAPAN 34 SKETCH-MAP OF AREA CONTAINING THE BATTLE-FIELDS OF LIAO-YANG, THE SHA HO, HEI-KOU-TAI, AND MUKDEN, SHOWING SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT PLACES MENTIONED _At the end_ MAP OF THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS SOUTH OF MUKDEN _At the end_ THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE JAPANESE WAR CHAPTER IX REASONS FOR OUR REVERSES (_continued_) The insufficient tactical preparation of our troops—Measures taken to improve it. I have touched upon the fact of how our want of tactical training was shown up in the Crimean and second Turkish Wars. Especially conspicuous was the inability of our senior commanders—relying as they usually did upon quite inadequate information as to the enemy’s strength and dispositions—to co-ordinate the operations of the different arms towards one end, and their ignorance of where to deliver the main attack. The minor part played by our cavalry and our comparatively great power of defence were also remarked. Finally, attention was drawn to the fact that our lack of the power of manœuvre compelled us to place superior numbers in the field against the Turks, a course which had not formerly been necessary.