“In many instances staff-officers with troops seemed ignorant of how a reconnaissance should be carried out, and consequently did not gauge the dispositions of the enemy’s forces with sufficient accuracy. This reacted in turn on the dispositions made by the chief commanders, more particularly in their employment of the reserves (Kursk manœuvres and those at Pskoff and Vlodava). Similarly, they did not know how to arrange for the maintenance of touch along the front and to the rear, a defect which caused a delay in the receipt of orders and information which was quite avoidable. “2. _Work of the Cavalry at Manœuvres._ “The increased importance now attached to the strategic or independent duties of cavalry has, in my opinion, acted detrimentally upon the cavalry work with the troops. The spirit of the strategic rôle was in most cases not properly grasped, and the chief idea of the masses of mounted troops of both sides appeared to be to meet each other. They therefore neglected to furnish the commanders of their sides with the information of the enemy, so necessary before an action, and left the infantry without their co-operation during the actual combat; this was the same whether they were acting in attack or defence. Long-distance patrols often did useful work, but owing to the lack of proper means for the quick transmission of the information collected, it reached the troops to whom it might be useful after the enemy’s dispositions had been changed. The near patrols did not work in with the long-distance ones. Our mounted troops were frequently allowed to lose touch with the enemy at night under the pretext that the men and horses required rest, and the employment of a dozen troopers was grudged after dark, when by day whole divisions and corps were futilely marched and countermarched, and sent upon duties which were not always in accordance with the general idea of the operations. “The cavalry work should be more strictly in co-operation with that of the other arms than it is at present, and all officers in command of mounted units should remember that their rôle is auxiliary, and largely consists in assisting the General in command to come to a proper decision by the completeness and accuracy of the information they send back; that the cavalry should help the commanders, firstly, to frame a plan of action, then to crush the enemy on the field of battle. “3. _Attack and the Defence._