The Russian Revolution; The Jugo-Slav Movement — John Shaqi
The Russian Revolution; The Jugo-Slav MovementPetrunkevitch, Alexander
History
The Russian Revolution; The Jugo-Slav Movement
Petrunkevitch, Alexander
Soviet Union -- History -- Revolution, 1917-1921; Soviet Union -- Politics and government -- 1917-1936; Yugoslavs
The court circle was not ignorant of what was being said for the spies
kept them fully informed. In conversation with a journalist two months
before the outbreak of the revolution, the Minister of the Interior,
Protopopov, a protege of Rasputin, said that he was aware of the
revolutionary propaganda and that he was ready to face any attempt that
might be made to overthrow the government.
"I will not stop at anything," he remarked,... "the first thing that I
shall do is to send them [revolutionaries] from the capital by the car
loads. But I will strangle the revolution no matter what the cost may
be." [FN: _Novoe Vremia_, March 19-April 1, 1917.] He had no doubt
that he could handle the situation and he inspired those about him with
the same confidence, particularly the Emperor whom he assured that the
discontent was confined chiefly to the intelligentsia and to a small
number of the gentry, and that the common people and the army were
devoted to the autocracy.
To the question that arises why the revolution, which was expected after
the war, came off before its conclusion, the answer is that the present
revolution was not planned nor desired by any one of importance; it came
as a surprise to all. It just happened. If some one must have the credit
or blame, it is Protopopov who was at the time suspected of being queer
mentally and who has since lost his reason entirely. He was so sure of
himself and of his ability to put down the uprising and thereby
show himself a real statesman that he concluded not to wait for the
revolution to come in the ordinary course of events, but to hurry it a
bit. Although there is no conclusive proof for this statement, there
is plenty of convincing circumstantial evidence. We know that it was
proposed to have the workmen of Petrograd strike on February 27, the day
of the opening of the Duma, as a protest against the government; we
know also that to meet this situation, the Minister of the Interior had
placed machine guns in the garrets, in steeples, on housetops, and other
such places where they could command the important streets and shoot
down the mob. The rising did not take place because Miliukov, the great
liberal leader, learned that the Government was behind this move and
that preparations had been made to slaughter the unsuspecting workmen.
He, therefore, addressed them in an open letter calling on them not to
make any demonstration, and they did not. For the time being the strike
was off, but the air was full of discontent and restlessness, and it was
difficult to say when trouble would break out again. With this in view,
a number of representatives of various organizations met to discuss
the situation and to determine what attitude they should take and what
counsel they should give to the labor leaders. Miliukov and a few
others urged that all uprisings should be discouraged because they would
interfere with the war, would cost the lives of many innocent persons,
and would accomplish nothing.
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