An external _percipibile_ is not admissible in consequence of the following dilemma. Does the object cognitively apprehensible arise from an entity or not? It does not result from an entity, for that which is generated has no permanence. Nor is it non-resultant, for what has not come into being is non-existent. Or (we may proceed) do you hold that a past object is cognitively apprehensible, as begetting cognition? If so, this is childish nonsense, because it conflicts with the apparent presentness of the object, and because on such a supposition the sense organs (and other imperceptible things) might be apprehended. Further (we ask), Is the _percipibile_ a simple atom or a complex body? The latter it cannot be, this alternative being ejected by the dilemma as to whether part or whole is perceived. The former alternative is equally impossible, an atom being supersensible, and it not being able to combine simultaneously with six others; as it has been said-- "If an atom could simultaneously combine with six, it would have six surfaces; "And each of these being taken separately, there would be a body of atomic dimension." Intellect, therefore, as having no other _percipibile_ but itself, is shown to be itself its own _percipibile_, self-subsistent, luminous with its own light, like light. Therefore it has been said-- "There is naught to be objectified by intellect; there is no cognition ulterior thereto; "There being no distinction between percept and percipient, intellect shines forth of itself alone." The identity of percipient and percept is inferrible, thus: That which is cognised by any cognition is not other than that cognition, as soul, for instance, is not other than the cognition of soul; and blue and other momentary objects are cognised by cognitions. For if there were a difference (between percept and percipient), the object could not now have any connection with the cognition, there being no identity to determine a constancy of connection, and nothing to determine the rise of such a connection. As for the appearance of an interval between the object and subject consciousnesses, this is an illusion, like the appearance of two moons when there is only one. The cause of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream without beginning and without interruption; as it has been said-- "As invariably cognised together, the blue object and the cognition thereof are identical; "And the difference should be accounted for by illusory cognitions, as in the example of the single moon." And again-- "Though there is no division, the soul or intellect, by reason of illusory perceptions, "Appears to possess a duality of cognitions, of percepts and of percipient."