[Footnote 35: Cf. Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 213. "If every _completed_ object of cognition must consist of object _plus_ the subject, the object without the subject must be incomplete, that is, inchoate--that is, no possible object of knowledge at all. This is the distressing predicament to which matter is reduced by the tactics of speculation; and this predicament is described not unaptly by calling it a _flux_--or, as we have depicted it elsewhere, perhaps more philosophically, as a never-ending redemption of nonsense into sense, and a never-ending relapse of sense into nonsense."] [Footnote 36: Cf. Burnouf, _Lotus_, p. 520.--Should we read _samudaya_?] [Footnote 37: Cf. G. H. Lewes' History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 85. "We not only see that the architect's plan determined the arrangement of materials in the house, but we see why it must have done so, because the materials have no spontaneous tendency to group themselves into houses; that not being a recognised property of bricks, mortar, wood, and glass. But what we know of organic materials is that they _have_ this spontaneous tendency to arrange themselves in definite forms; precisely as we see chemical substances arranging themselves in definite forms without the intervention of any extra-chemical agency."] [Footnote 38: These are not the usual four 'sublime truths;' cf. p. 30.] [Footnote 39: Mádhava probably derived most of his knowledge of Buddhist doctrines from Brahmanical works; consequently some of his explanations (as, _e.g._, that of _samudáya_ or _samudaya_, &c.) seem to be at variance with those given in Buddhist works.] CHAPTER III. THE ÁRHATA SYSTEM. The Gymnosophists[40] (Jainas), rejecting these opinions of the Muktakachchhas,[41] and maintaining continued existence to a certain extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything. (They say): If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will be useless. But surely this can never be imagined as possible--that one should act and another reap the consequences! Therefore as this conviction, "I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap its consequences," establishes undoubtedly the existence of a continuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the subsequent period, the discriminating Jaina Arhats reject as untenable the doctrine of momentary existence, _i.e._, an existence which lasts only an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part.