If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that "the perception does not follow the object in being insentient," then there would be no perception that the object is insentient,[45] and so it is a case of the proverb, "While he looks for one thing which he has lost, another drops." "But what harm will it be if there is no perception of a thing's being insentient?" [We reply], that if its being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form is perceived, the two may be quite distinct [and as different from each other as a jar and cloth], or it may be a case of "indeterminateness" [so that the two may be only occasionally found together, as smoke with fire]. And again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the blue form, how could there then be conformity between them [so that both the blue and the insentience should together constitute the character of the thing?] We might just as well maintain that, on perceiving a post, the unperceived universe entered into it as also constituting its character.[46] All this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full length by the Jaina authors, Pratápachandra and others, in the _Prameyakamalamártaṇḍa_, &c., and is here omitted for fear of swelling the book too much. Therefore those who wish for the _summum bonum_ of man must not accept the doctrine of Buddha, but rather honour only the Árhata doctrine. The Arhat's nature has been thus described by Arhachchandra-súri,[47] in his _Áptaniśchayálaṅkára_. "The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient one, who has overcome all faults, desire, &c.,--adored by the three worlds, the declarer of things as they are." But may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul can enter the path of proof, since none of the five affirmative proofs can be found to apply, as has been declared by Tautátita [Bhaṭṭa Kumárila[48]]? 1. "No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in this world by ourselves or others; nor is there any part of him seen which might help us as a sign to infer his existence. 2. "Nor is there any injunction (_vidhi_) of scripture which reveals an eternal omniscient one, nor can the meaning of the explanatory passages (_arthaváda_) be applied here. 3. "His existence is not declared by those passages which refer to quite other topics; and it cannot be contained in any emphatic repetitions (_anuváda_), as it had never been mentioned elsewhere before. 4. "An omniscient being who had a beginning can never be the subject of the eternal Veda; and how can he be established by a made and spurious Veda? 5. "Do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on his own word? How can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal support? 6. "[If you say,] 'The saying is true because it was uttered by one omniscient, and this proves the Arhat's existence;' how can either point be established without some previously established foundation?