Intelligence (_chaitanya_) is common to all souls, and is the real nature of the soul viewed as _pariṇata_ [_i.e._, as it is in itself]; but by the influence of _upaśamakshaya_ and _kshayopaśama_ it appears in the "mixed" form as possessing both,[62] or again, by the influence of actions as they arise, it assumes the appearance of foulness, &c.[63] As has been said by Váchakáchárya [in a sútra]-- "The _aupaśamika_, the _Ksháyika_, and the 'mixed' states are the nature of the soul, and also the _audayika_ and the _Páriṇámika_." 1. The _aupaśamika_ state of the soul arises when all the effects of past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise [to affect the future], as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing nut-plant,[64] &c. 2. The _Ksháyika_ state arises when there is the absolute abolition of actions and their effects, as in final liberation. 3. The "mixed" (_miśra_) state combines both these, as when water is partly pure. 4. The _audayika_ state is when actions arise [exerting an inherent influence on the future]. The _Páriṇámika_ state is the soul's innate condition, as pure intelligence, &c., and disregarding its apparent states, as (1), (2), (3), (4).[65] This nature, in one of the above-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether happy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the sútra quoted above. This has been explained in the _Svarúpa-sambodhana_-- "Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical with it,--in some way both different and the same,--knowledge is its first and last; such is the soul described to be." If you say that, "As difference and identity are mutually exclusive, we must have one or the other in the case of the soul, and its being equally both is absurd," we reply, that there is no evidence to support you when you characterise it as absurd. Only a valid non-perception[66] can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd; but this is not found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the advocates of the _Syád-váda_) it is perfectly notorious that all things present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes. Others lay down a different set of _tattvas_ from the two mentioned above, _jíva_ and _ajíva_; they hold that there are five _astikáyas_ or categories,--_jíva_, _ákáśa_, _dharma_, _adharma_, and _pudgala_. To all these five we can apply the idea of "existence" (_asti_),[67] as connected with the three divisions of time, and we can similarly apply the idea of "body" (_káya_),[68] from their occupying several parts of space.