The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages. — John Shaqi
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
It is the same case with those passions we have been just now
considering. Their immediate effects are so disagreeable, that even when
they are most justly provoked, there is still something about them which
disgusts us. These, therefore, are the only passions of which the
expressions, as I formerly observed, do not dispose and prepare us to
sympathize with them, before we are informed of the cause which excites
them. The plaintive voice of misery, when heard at a distance, will not
allow us to be indifferent about the person from whom it comes. As soon
as it strikes our ear, it interests us in his fortune, and, if
continued, forces us almost involuntarily to fly to his assistance. The
sight of a smiling countenance, in the same manner, elevates even the
pensive into that gay and airy mood, which disposes him to sympathize
with, and share the joy which it expresses; and he feels his heart,
which with thought and care was before that shrunk and depressed,
instantly expanded and elated. But it is quite otherwise with the
expressions of hatred and resentment. The hoarse, boisterous, and
discordant voice of anger, when heard at a distance, inspires us either
with fear or aversion. We do not fly towards it, as to one who cries out
with pain and agony. Women, and men of weak nerves, tremble and are
overcome with fear, though sensible that themselves are not the objects
of the anger. They conceive fear, however, by putting themselves in the
situation of the person who is so. Even those of stouter hearts are
disturbed; not indeed enough to make them afraid, but enough to make
them angry; for anger is the passion which they would feel in the
situation of the other person. It is the same case with hatred. Mere
expressions of spite inspire it against no body, but the man who uses
them. Both these passions are by nature the objects of our aversion.
Their disagreeable and boisterous appearance never excites, never
prepares, and often disturbs our sympathy. Grief does not more
powerfully engage and attract us to the person in whom we observe it,
than these, while we are ignorant of their cause, disgust and detach us
from him. It was, it seems, the intention of Nature, that those rougher
and more unamiable emotions, which drive men from one another, should be
less easily and more rarely communicated.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account