The Theory of Stock Exchange SpeculationCrump, Arthur
General
The Theory of Stock Exchange Speculation
Crump, Arthur
Speculation
Now, if the playing of public games of hazard are on the decline from
the interference of the State on moral grounds, the question arises: are
there any considerations applying to Stock Exchange gambling, which,
as a game, raises it above other games of chance, and entitles it to
special privileges? Does the outside haphazard speculator stand a better
chance as against the Stock Exchange, than a player at _Rouge et noir_
against the bank? The answer must be No. Exactly the same considerations
apply to commercial speculations as to other games of chance in which no
absolute certainty exists. Mathematicians lay it down as a law, that if
any possible event which cannot frequently occur in a game of chance,
but which is, nevertheless, a part of the nature of the game, if a bet
or stake be made upon the recurrence of that event in a proportion to
some large gain which it is agreed that event shall secure, then prudence
demands that the game shall be often played; and if this be impossible
it shall not be played at all. Here we come to the crux of the whole
question of Stock Exchange speculation. Unless a speculator, handicapped
as we shall show he is to start with, has enough means to enable him
to hold out for the arrival of the event, the occurrence of which is
absolutely necessary to his keeping above water, he should not speculate
at all.[7]
What is the one event constituting the benefit for which the speculator
operates? it will be asked. The answer is, the greatest fluctuation in
the direction favorable to him which may be caused by any one of the many
influences that may spring into action at any time. This is part of the
mystery which allures people on. If you tell persons who are throwing a
die that the six will turn up once in six times in the long run, they can
form some estimate of their chance of winning. But until a Stock Exchange
speculator has been roughly undeceived, his understanding gets entangled
so that what he sees clearly only at first, is what is in his favour,
because his first interest is to discover that. What is against him, he
disregards until he has discovered it has undermined him, and all goes
together.
In cases where the public play against a bank, it is so managed that
the bank has a better chance than the players. It is so managed that a
considerable succession of losses can be sustained against the good luck
of any comer. One side always secures to itself the benefits of _the long
run_. The haphazard speculator stands at the same disadvantage as the
player against the bank. His position is always relatively inferior. When
the balance is nothing, as worked out by the following rule as stated by
De Morgan, then the play is equal:—“_Multiply each gain or loss by the
probability of the event on which it depends; compare the total result of
the gains with that of the losses: the balance is the average required,
and is known by the name of the mathematical expectation._”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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