POSIDONIUS.—But does not a father, in begetting his son, act as a blind agent? Does he pretend, when he enjoys his wife, to make a soul, or to make thoughts? Do either of them know the manner in which a child is formed in the mother’s womb? Must we not, in this case, have recourse to a superior cause, as well as in all the other operations of nature which we have examined? Must you not see, if you are in earnest, that men give themselves nothing, but are under the hand of an absolute master? LUCRETIUS.—If you know more of the matter than I do, tell me what the soul is. POSIDONIUS.—I do not pretend to know what it is more than you. Let us endeavor to enlighten each other. Tell me, first, what is vegetation. LUCRETIUS.—It is an internal motion, that carries the moisture of the earth into plants, makes them grow, unfolds their fruits, expands their leaves, etc. POSIDONIUS.—Surely you do not think that there is a being called _Vegetation_ that performs these wonders? LUCRETIUS.—Who ever thought so? POSIDONIUS.—From our former colloquy you ought to conclude that the tree did not give vegetation to itself. LUCRETIUS.—I am forced to allow it. POSIDONIUS.—Tell me next what life is. LUCRETIUS.—It is vegetation joined with perception in an organized body. POSIDONIUS.—And is there not a being called life, that gives perception to an organized body? LUCRETIUS.—Doubtless vegetation and life are words which signify things that live and vegetate. POSIDONIUS.—If a tree and an animal cannot give themselves life and vegetation, can you give yourself thoughts? LUCRETIUS.—I think I can, for I think of whatever I please. My intention was to converse with you about metaphysics, and I have done so. POSIDONIUS.—You think that you are master of your ideas; do you know, then, what thoughts you will have in an hour, or in a quarter of an hour? LUCRETIUS.—I must own that I do not. POSIDONIUS.—You frequently have ideas in your sleep; you make verses in a dream: Cæsar takes cities: I resolve problems; and hounds pursue the stag in their dreams. Ideas, therefore, come to us independently of our own will; they are given us by a Superior Being. LUCRETIUS.—In what manner do you mean? Do you suppose that the Supreme Being is continually employed in communicating ideas; or that he created incorporeal substances, which were afterwards capable of forming ideas of themselves, sometimes with the assistance of the senses, and sometimes without it? Are these substances formed at the moment of the animal’s conception? Or are they formed before its conception? Do they wait for bodies, in order to insinuate themselves into them? or are they not lodged there till the animal is capable of receiving them? Or, in fine, is it in the Supreme Being that every animated being sees the ideas of things? What is your opinion?